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Abstract
The U.S. government engaged in Arctic security and politics at a low 
level throughout early 2000s, while the Russian government was quite active in 
it Arctic region during this timeframe. Using text, data and visual analysis tools, 
this research conducts content analysis, sentiment analysis and mapping on 
U.S. Arctic intelligence documents released through Wikileaks. It compares 
patterns found in the content of intelligence documents with content and 
sentiment patterns found in U.S. Arctic policy to correlate a shared perception of 
Russian Arctic engagement. Research findings indicate that the dialogue about 
Russian engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s in both the intelligence 
community (IC) and policy-making communities attribute a low level of threat to 
U.S. national security with regard to Arctic issues. These findings may 
contribute to the lack of U.S. engagement in the Arctic leading up to the 
Crimean/Ukraine conflict.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
During the course of this research project, Russian-U.S. relations in the 
Arctic have fallen to their lowest point since the Cold War. In 2014, Russian 
aggression in Crimea and the Ukraine elicited sanctions from the United States 
that affected Russian Arctic oil extraction partnerships. Later in 2014 Russia 
began to increase displays of military might in the Arctic via land, water, and air 
exercises. U.S. response to such behavior has been measured, despite 
increased tension between the nations, and publicly the United States 
maintains aspirations for peace and cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. As 
time passed Russian aggression spread from Eastern Europe to the Arctic and 
now into the Middle East. This research project looks to the decade preceding 
current tensions to understand the extent to which the U.S. has securitized (i.e. 
perceived a threat to national security that puts the nation state, sovereign 
borders, values, or its citizens in peril) Russian engagement in the Arctic.
This project explores U.S perceptions of threat about Russia’s Arctic 
engagement during the early 2000s. It does this by looking for discursive 
patterns found in U.S. intelligence documents collected on Russia and the Arctic 
from 2004 to 2011 and Arctic policy documents from 2009 to 2015. The project’s 
intelligence sources are not military intelligence, but theories explored later in 
the thesis support the use of non-military intelligence in understanding 
securitization and threat perceptions. Intelligence is useful for this research 
because it is a building block of policy, and because intelligence gathering and
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analysis plays a key role in detecting threat and risk to state actors.
Many additional variables and sources contribute to U.S. perceptions of 
Russia and the Russian Arctic. In general, historical discourses and cultural 
discourses shape perceptions of Russia and the Arctic, including those 
discourses taking place in news media and entertainment. In fact, news media is 
used in intelligence gathering as well, and is often referred to as "open source 
intelligence.” This project’s data set contains such open source intelligence. I 
limited and focused the scope of my inquiry on perceptions of Russia and the 
Russian Arctic to intelligence because it is a "secret” and "protected” discourse.
In her 2000 book Dreamworld and Catastrophe about how mass "dreamworlds” 
shape and drive human behavior, Susan Buck-Morss links perceptions of threat 
and violence with secrets when she argues that the domains of threat, violence, 
and ultimately warfare are secret spaces and secret powers.1 According to Buck- 
Morss, to protect itself from threats the state must have internal secret mandates 
that allow the state to send secret actors externally to secretly disarm, contain, or 
de-stabilize the threats. Secrets, secret conversations and protected discourses 
are paramount to understanding perceptions of threat and the violent (or non­
violent) behaviors of the state.
Moreover, the insider roles of intelligence and policymakers give these 
secrets potency. Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political examines the roles 
of political enemies and friends. Schmitt argues that the designation of a friend or
1 Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing o f Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 16, 20-21.
2
enemy of the state (a designation which is built upon perceived level of threat): 
"can neither be decided by a previously decided general norm nor by judgment of 
a disinterested and therefore neutral party. Only the actual participants can 
correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the 
extreme case of conflict.”2
Secret and private discourses originating from inside the state are the 
discourses of vested parties in conflict, and ultimately these parties’ perceptions 
will affect possible future government action. In light of the above, this project 
examines the level of threat detected by U.S. State Department intelligence and 
private U.S. intelligence sources with regard to Russia’s Arctic engagement.
In this work, threat is not treated as an absolute. Instead, threat is 
understood to have degrees of severity: lack of threat, low level of threat, 
medium level of threat, high level of threat, urgent threat. This concept of a 
degree of threat follows U.S. government notions about threat seen in 
classification language (see page 71 for definitions), or in the Homeland Security 
threat advisory system, also referred to as the "terror threat level.” It is my belief 
that perceptions of threat prompt state action, but also that threat is crucial to the 
state’s self-concept, or identity. In the process of identifying a threat the state is 
simultaneously creating and defining itself. This identity is intrinsically tied to the 
creation of an "other,” or to reference the work of Carl Schmitt, the "enemy.”
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2 Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 27.
In this project, I assume that if the U.S. actors examined agree about a 
high degree of threat to U.S. state interests from Russian engagement in the 
Arctic, it is more likely that the United States will take action in response to this 
threat. Alternately, if the U.S. actors examined in this project do not agree, or do 
not consistently identify a serious threat from Russia’s development of its Arctic, I 
expect a low level of U.S. action in response to an ambiguous degree of threat. I 
examine this topic further in the discussion of my hypothesis below. In short, after 
two years of my own open-source monitoring on Arctic security and politics, I 
have not seen a high level of military or diplomatic engagement from the U.S. 
government in the Arctic. This lack of engagement leads me to hypothesize that 
U.S. actors did not detect a consistent, high-level threat stemming from Russia’s 
Arctic engagement. While U.S. lack of engagement in the Arctic could be 
influenced by other factors, this project proposes that threats to state interests 
prompt state action, and that it is through discourse that threat is determined and 
communicated.
The type of "action,” with which this project primarily concerns itself are 
those that expand U.S. military and constabulary (policing, search and rescue, oil 
spill response, coast guard, and other such non-military security functions) 
capacities. This understanding of action as a response to socially-constructed 
and perceived threat is rooted in international relations theory of constructivism 
which posits that state interests and identity are created by social practice as 
opposed to being innate and un-changing. Constructivist understandings of the
4
social processes that create and define state interest, threat and security ground 
my hypothesis and research.
The inquiry seeks to understand U.S. perceptions of threat, which are 
viewed in this project as a potential driving force for the U.S.’s own Arctic 
activities. Presumably, the perception of a high-level threat from Russia’s Arctic 
endeavors would prompt increased U.S. Arctic engagement. By the same token, 
a lack of or low-level of threat detected from Russia’s Arctic engagements would 
explain a lack of U.S. engagement in the Arctic. This research project, while 
mainly focused on securitization in intelligence and policy sources, ultimately 
contributes to a larger discussion about the U.S.’s minimal engagement in the 
Arctic.
Lack of U.S. engagement is characterized by a decreased number of 
Arctic-trained forces, by repeated ignored requests from multiple agencies for 
new Arctic-capable icebreakers, and by lagging behind other Arctic nations (as 
well as some non-Arctic nations) in policy documents and high-level engagement 
in Arctic governmental forums such as the Arctic Council. "Lack of engagement” 
does not mean that the U.S. has completely disengaged in Arctic governance, 
military capacity or infrastructure. The phrase "lack of engagement” is meant to 
describe the minimal or lower level of engagement the U.S. has taken when 
compared with its Arctic and Arctic-interested counterparts, and going forward 
the terms lack of engagement and low-level of engagement will be used 
interchangeably.
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The time period of study is historically significant not only because it 
precedes the present day strained U.S.-Russian relations. The early 2000s saw 
the emergence of the Russian Federation as a global power, the strengthening 
and expansion of the Arctic Council, changing roles of the U.S.3 and Russia as 
global producers of oil and gas, and increased attention to climatic changes 
taking place in the Arctic. Arctic governance was emerging during this time 
period, and can be considered as approaching formalization. During the study 
period (2004 -  2011), U.S.-Russian relations were reasonably cordial. In the 
Arctic, U.S.-Russian relations were marked by efforts at peace and cooperation. 
That being said, U.S.-Russian diplomatic affairs were never stress-free. Despite 
cordial relations, Russia’s role in the Arctic has historically evoked discomfort in 
the United States and other Arctic nations. Despite aspirations for cooperation in 
the Arctic, tension and mistrust are increasing. It is instructive to examine this 
emerging period in Arctic relations, as it sets the stage for the U.S. governments’ 
own behavior and capacities in the Arctic today, particularly with regard to its 
perceptions of Russia’s aims. This analysis links perceptions of threat, 
securitization and U.S. engagement.
In 2014 and 2015 the United States began to engage at increasingly high 
levels in Arctic-region specific concerns, including producing several key policy 
documents. This engagement comes quite late in comparison to actions taken by 
other Arctic nations. Russia began investing more heavily in its Arctic
6
3 "U.S Field Production of Crude Oil 1860 -  2014,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, October 30, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a.
infrastructure, oil and gas development, and expanding its Arctic military and 
naval capacity in 2009. Despite a history of tense relations between the U.S. and 
Russia the U.S. did not securitize Russia's activities in the Arctic, at least in 2009. 
Had the U.S. securitized Russian behavior in the Arctic in 2009, it would have 
asserted itself in governance or military activities at that time, rather than waiting 
until 2015 to engage more energetically.
This thesis examines intelligence and policy documents to answer the 
following research questions: 1) To what extent did intelligence sources 
securitize Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s? and 2) Does the 
discourse of U.S. intelligence about Russian engagement in the Arctic align with 
the discourse of U.S. Arctic policy?
While many factors influence policy, including: geopolitics, budget 
allocations, intra-governmental dynamics, domestic politics, lobby interests, civil 
society, and (particularly in the Arctic) scientific research, this project examines 
congruities or incongruities between intelligence texts and policy texts. Because 
the dataset is text-based, and because the process of securitization revolves 
around what theorists call the "speech act,” this research project is framed by 
discourse theory’s ideas about the power of language. The theory of discourse 
analysis informs the project’s research. The thesis’s discourse analysis is a part 
of a three-tiered methodological approach that analyzes production and 
distribution patterns of the intelligence dataset, performs a discourse analysis of
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the content of the dataset, and culminates in a comparison of the intelligence 
data and the policy data.
The thesis closes with a comparison of intelligence sources and policy 
documents regarding the security threat that Russian Arctic engagement poses 
to the U.S. This comparison aims to reveal any possible disconnect between 
foreign policy intelligence sources and policy documents. Following this 
Introduction, a chapter titled "Setting the Scene” examines U.S. Arctic policy and 
the relationship between intelligence and foreign policy. The chapter "Theoretical 
Framework” explains how constructivism, discourse theory and critical discourse 
analysis views language and text as shaping perceptions and creating cultures of 
understanding. A chapter titled "Data” introduces the intelligence and policy 
datasets followed by sections for micro-, meso- and macro-levels of analysis that 
incorporate sentiment analysis and content analysis. The "Findings” chapter 
summarizes the multi-tiered analysis of the U.S. intelligence data’s non­
securitized stance towards Russian engagement in the Arctic. To wrap up, the 
Conclusion summarizes the findings and makes predictions about the future of 
Arctic intelligence and policy.
My analysis detects a pattern of low-level of classification in State 
Department and private intelligence documents. Patterns in tagging and email 
coding in both State Department and private intelligence emphasize a political 
(as opposed to a defense) focus in the documents. References to locations (also 
called "location entities”) imply a consistent perception of the Arctic as a region or
8
issue that is global in nature, but with a Western European emphasis. Patterns in 
sentiment analysis of all documents fail to return a consistently negative- 
sentiment trend. When findings are viewed collectively, a consistent non­
securitized pattern emerges in how State Department and private intelligence 
personnel assess Russian Arctic engagement. These patterns in intelligence 
data agree with content and sentiment patterns in U.S. Arctic policy.
9
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Chapter 2 Setting the Scene 
Despite Russia representing a long-standing adversary that has been the 
subject of decades of U.S. intelligence collection and observation, Russia is still a 
surprisingly aggressive actor on the modern world stage. The U.S. appeared to 
have been caught off-guard by Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, 
surprised again by Russian engagement in greater Ukraine, and uncertain about 
Russian behaviors in the Arctic. The United States continues to seek political 
solutions to increasingly problematic relations between Russia and the West.
U.S. concern about Russian behavior at its border with Ukraine is 
inextricably tied to behavior along its northern border in the Arctic. U.S.-backed 
sanctions1 have hamstrung development of Russian Arctic oil and gas reserves 
in the high Arctic. Particularly affected are the Yamal LNG development project2 
and the Sakhalin gas project3. Russia relies on collaboration with international 
and multinational partners to develop its vital shipping infrastructure and energy 
resources in the Arctic. It lacks the industrial-technical capacity to meet its 
economic imperative to develop the Arctic region. Russia’s need for international 
cooperation to pursue its goals in the Arctic bodes well for peace in the region. 
Nevertheless in 2014 and 2015, Russian jets appeared with increased frequency
1 Bureau of Industry and Security, and Eric L. Hirschhorn, "Federal Register: Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List.” Department Of Commerce, August 25, 2015, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-09-02/pdf/2015-21682.pdf.
2 James Marso and Selina Williams, "Sanctions Bite Massive Gas Project in Russian Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctions-bite-massive-gas-project- in-russian-arctic-1440667802.
3 Atle Staalesen, "New US Sanctions against Russian Oil,” Eye on the Arctic, August 10, 2015, http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/08/10/new-us-sanctions-against-russian-oil/.
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in Alaskan, Finnish and Norwegian airspace. During this same period Russian 
submarines were detected in Arctic and sub-Arctic territorial waters of other 
Arctic states.
Concerns regarding Russia’s Arctic agenda are not new. At one time or 
another all of the Arctic states have publicly expressed concern over Russia’s 
Arctic behavior; however, that concern has not always become a securitized 
stance. Some of the Arctic states have been more outspoken about their 
concerns than others. Speaking in 2007 at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) Finland’s Minister of Defense Jyri Hakamies said of 
Russia, "... given our geographical location, the three main security challenges 
for Finland today are Russia, Russia, and Russia -  and not only for Finland, but 
for all of us.4” Russia is the only non-Western Arctic nation, and historically it has 
had the most contentious relationships with its near neighbors. The West treats 
Russia with some disregard for its historically brutish military behavior, hawkish 
foreign policy, reckless environmental practices, questionable business 
standards, and callous mistreatment of its indigenous peoples, journalists, and 
other Kremlin-opposing dissenters.
The media has at times taken a "securitized” stance towards Russian 
engagement in the Arctic before the U.S. government has done so. Media 
sources from Newsweek to The Economist speculate about the Russian Arctic 
threat, and pundits take turns shaming, eulogizing, and fetishizing Arctic oil.
4 Jyri Hakamies, "Finland: Similar Yet Different,” Transcript presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): Statesmen’s Forum, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/070910 sf hakamies.pdf.
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Sentiments about Russia’s plans for the Arctic range from pessimism, to 
concern, to outright alarm. Yet these behaviors that cause such consternation 
within the Western media about expanded Russian Arctic military developments 
and thirst for Arctic oil are the outcome of publically available Russian Arctic 
policy. Russian Arctic policy, signed in 2008 and made available to the public in 
2009 quite clearly outlines its Arctic strategy in three phases, of which Russia is 
currently completing phase two. This policy includes expanded military and 
border control functions, development of the region for oil and gas extraction, and 
infrastructure improvements for increased shipping activity 5
Western media has documented its concern over Russian Arctic 
engagement, and recent events, including increased incursions of Russia in 
other nations’ air space and territorial waters, substantiate this concern. Like 
Western media, the U.S. government could also have perceived and discussed 
Russian Arctic military development in the early 2000s with alarm. But until very 
recently, neither official U.S. Arctic policy nor U.S. Arctic engagement 
demonstrated significant levels of concern about Russian activities in the Arctic.
U.S. perceptions of Russia in the Arctic-theater shape U.S. Arctic policy 
and intelligence is one key factor in assessing and determining threat.
Intelligence is a building block of policy, and a complicated symbiosis exists 
between the policy-making world and the intelligence community (IC). The 
intelligence process collects the raw data, separates the wheat from the chaff,
5 "Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020,” Russian Federation, 2009,http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/29%20Russian%20Arctic%20Strat
13
egy%20Until%202020%20BW.pdf.
and presents the policy-making community with analysis: the intelligence 
product. Many decisions shape the collection and synthesis of this intelligence 
data, and these decisions are driven by perceptions of threat and risk.
Intelligence is created in service of policy-makers. Not all intelligence 
products are incorporated into policy. Primarily intelligence functions to 
contextualize on-the-ground developments for actors who formulate national 
security policy. Writes Jason U. Manosevitz for the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, 
"U.S. policymakers want intelligence that helps them avoid surprise, understand 
evolving developments, and identify opportunities to advance U.S. objectives or 
avoid risks to national security interests.”6 Intelligence products can come in the 
form of reports, summaries, briefings, but also in the form of participation in 
advisory bodies. This is the case with U.S. Arctic intelligence, which is built from 
advisory bodies and committees representing an array of agencies.
A 2011 joint report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) led 
by Greg Treverton, former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council 
(NIC), states quite clearly that ". . . IC officials play advisory roles at meetings at 
every level of the interagency policy process.”7 U.S. Arctic policy is
14
6Jason U. Manosevitz, "Needed: More Thinking about Conceptual Frameworks for Analysis—The Case of Influence,” Studies in Intelligence, Bolstering Analytic Tradecraft, 57, no. 4 (December 2013): 15-22, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi- studies/studies/vol-57-no-4/pdfs/Manosevitz-FocusingConceptual%20Frameworks-Dec2013.pdf.
7."Probing the Implications of Changing the Outputs of Intelligence, A Report of the 2011 Analyst- IC Associate Teams Program,” Studies in Intelligence, Products or Outputs?, 56, no. 1 (March 
2012): 1-11, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
predominantly informed by interagency bodies, all of which include security and 
intelligence representation. Interagency steering committees on U.S. Arctic policy 
include the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC), the Interagency Arctic 
Research Policy Committee (IARPC), and the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs 
(OPA). Agencies within four executive branch departments participate in inter­
agency committees on U.S. Arctic policy as part of the U.S.’s 17-member 
intelligence community. These departments are the Department of Defense 
(DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the National Security Agency (NSA). In addition, other agencies active in 
U.S. Arctic policy such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the National Science Technology 
Council (NSTC), the Department of the Interior (DOI), and National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) have strong ties to defense and national 
security entities. The State Department, one of this research project’s sources, is 
a key actor in Arctic policy, and represents the United States at the Arctic 
Council.
15
studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-1/pdfs-vol-56.-no.-1/Products%20or%20Qutputs%20-Extracts-Mar12- 20Apr12.pdf.
16
2.1 U.S. Arctic Policy 
U.S. Arctic policy is in a period of change. The last twenty years have 
seen a slow increase in governmental concern for Arctic affairs as reflected in the 
increased number of Arctic policy documents from U.S. government agencies.
Yet this increase does not obviate the strikingly few public statements about the 
Arctic in the early part of the 2000s. Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski told the 
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee at the U.S. Arctic 
Opportunities Hearing: "...I can state with some certainty here that in 2005, the 
State Department was just not prepared to have a discussion on [Arctic] issues.”8 
External actors share this perception that federal U.S. Arctic policy lagged and 
lacked vigor. While Canada and Russia take more hawkish stances, and Iceland 
and the Scandinavian Arctic nations mobilize in response to economic incentives, 
the U.S., for much of the early 2000s, remained largely aloof in Arctic affairs. It 
was only in 2014 that the U.S. appointed a high ranking official to the Arctic 
Council, while other nations have long had ambassador-level politicians seated 
at the table. The U.S. remains the only Arctic state that is not party to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and while it is non-Arctic domestic concerns9 
that inform the decision, the U.S.’s refusal to ratify the treaty limits its ability to 
advance Arctic dialogue, or coordinate international efforts. The U.S. also lags
8 Murkowski, Sen. Lisa. United States Arctic Opportunities Hearing: Opening Remarks. Washington D.C., March 5 2015. http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/3/united- states-arctic-opportunities-hearing.
9 Patrick J. Bonner, "Neo-Isolationists Scuttle UNCLOS,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v033/33.2.bonner.html.
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behind other nations in its ice-ready fleet. Despite having the largest military and 
navy in the world, the U.S. has the least capable above-surface fleet, for use in 
Arctic conditions, of the five Arctic littoral states.10 Russia far surpasses the U.S. 
in modern icebreakers and ice-capable vessels, and soon, even non-Arctic 
states, such as India and China, will have more modern and more robust Arctic 
fleets than the United States. The U.S. Arctic also has the least infrastructure 
north of latitude 66, lacking in deep water ports, mobile bases for military or 
rescue operations, roads and other land-based transportation infrastructure.
While officials from Alaska,11 and heads of the U.S. Coast Guard and National 
Science Foundation12 have spoken frankly in public about U.S. deficiencies in the 
Arctic, their concerns are not reflected in U.S. Arctic policy, engagement, or 
spending. These frank assessments from a spectrum of actors have not 
galvanized the federal government into action in the Arctic.
The U.S.’s anemic engagement in the Arctic contrasts starkly with other 
Arctic states’ engagement, in particular that of Russia. U.S. Arctic policy 
documents will be analyzed for content and sentiment, to see whether U.S. policy 
corresponds with the sentiment and content found in U.S. Arctic intelligence 
documents.
10 The Arctic Littoral States are nations with coastal Arctic waters. These are, organized by length of coastline: Russia, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), United States and Norway.
11 An example of this is Senator Murkowski’s public response to President Obama’s Executive Order regarding ANWR, discussed in such press coverage as "Murkowski's primal scream on ANWR points to Alaska's precarious balance” Christian Science Monitor, and in statements made from the Senate Floor to the Senate Energy Committee on January 28, 2015 "Sen. Murkowski: Alaska Will Not be Treated as a Territory”
12 Implementing U.S. Policy in the Arctic, Washington D.C., July 23 2014, http://transportation.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=386881.
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2.2 The Link between Intelligence and Policy 
This research project focuses on the link between intelligence and policy. 
The relationship is convoluted, and because of the complex array of influences 
on U.S. foreign policies, this project will not attempt to attribute or assert causality 
between intelligence and U.S. Arctic policy. To do so would go well beyond the 
scope of this project. To summarize the connection between intelligence and 
policy: data acquired during intelligence collection is sifted and combined to 
become intelligence analytical products. These analytical products are presented 
to policy makers who may accept, change or ignore them. Policy subsequently 
may become government action; however implementation depends on factors 
such as political climate, significant actor engagement, budgetary considerations, 
and other conditions.
The transformation of data to action has been popularly described by the 
"DIKW pyramid,” symbolizing a hierarchy of knowing which is based in "data” and 
ascends into increasingly actionable forms of "information,” "knowledge” and 
finally (and somewhat elusively) "wisdom.” This hierarchical, unidirectional 
formula, while providing a template for the processing and refining of data that 
informs analysis, ignores the interplay between multidirectional and varied 
influences that shape understanding and the transmission of knowledge.
Much has been written on the highly complex relationship between policy 
and intelligence. National security expert, retired IC professional and scholar
Mark Lowenthal defines intelligence as "information that meets the stated or 
understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and 
narrowed to meet those needs.”13 Lowenthal stresses the active role of policy­
makers in shaping intelligence research and findings. Richard K. Betts, another 
influential expert in both the practice and discourse surrounding the IC, describes 
the IC as providing "the library function for national security: it keeps track of all 
sources, secret or not, and mobilizes them in coherent form whenever non-expert 
policymakers call for them.”14 On the other hand, Paul Pillar, of CIA pedigree, 
describes the relationship between intelligence and policy as "a dysfunctional 
relationship...broken and badly need(ing) repair.”15 Statements like Pillar’s drive 
the inquiry of this research project. Could there be a broken link between 
analysis and policy-making that explains the U.S.’s lack of engagement in the 
Arctic despite potentially troubling Russian actions in the region. The needs of 
the policy-makers, the instincts of intelligence analysts, real-world developments, 
and access to information shape the relationship between intelligence collection, 
intelligence products and policy-making.
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13 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Los Angeles: CQ Press College,
2011), 1.14 Richard K Betts, Enemies o f Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 6.
15 Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 15, doi:10.2307/20031908.
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter explains how answers to the research questions are to be 
found in this text-based dataset. To reprise, the research questions are: 1) To 
what extent did intelligence sources securitize Russian Arctic engagement in the 
early 2000s? and 2) Does the discourse of U.S. intelligence about Russian 
engagement in the Arctic align with the discourse of U.S. Arctic policy?
3.1 Building a Hypothesis 
The research questions aim to discern whether threat was detected in this 
dataset, but the findings have larger implications. If, for example, threat is 
detected and communicated within the intelligence dataset, but not within the 
policy documents of a corresponding timeframe, the findings suggest a 
disconnection between intelligence and policy. Similarly, if minimal language 
about risks and threats exists in the intelligence dataset, but much language 
about threat exists in the policy documents this will also suggest a disconnect 
between the two groups. This discord could result from any of the factors 
mentioned in the previous chapter on the link between intelligence and policy. 
Similarities in narrative patterns and level of threat detection indicate that the two 
groups share information and that they are in agreement about on-the-ground 
developments and their significance with regard to U.S. national security and
22
sovereign interests. To explain how I came to my hypotheses, I will adapt John 
Nash’s 1950 historic Nash Equilibrium for understanding this dynamic:
Table 1 Applying the Nash equilibrium
Policy - low threat Policy - high threat
Intelligence - low threat agreement disconnect
Intelligence - high threat disconnect agreement
Disconnection between the various narratives suggests that the discourse within 
one group is not extending into other group. Agreement implies trust and shared 
discourse between the two groups; however, agreement could stem from parallel 
discourses that arrive at the same conclusion.
While not ideal, disconnects between intelligence and policy is 
commonplace. Such a finding would not be unexpected in this research project. 
An unexpected finding of this project would be agreement between the two 
groups on a high level of threat. This finding is unexpected, not because Russian 
Arctic engagements during this time were not a threat to the future of U.S. 
sovereign interests, but because U.S. behavior during this time frame does not 
reflect a perception of high threat. Additionally, given the common understanding 
of U.S. Arctic policy documents during the early 2000s, unearthing patterns of 
discourse evincing a high perception of threat would be quite surprising.
My understanding of U.S. Arctic policy and U.S. Arctic behavior rests on 
my own daily observations over several years of open source monitoring of Arctic 
developments across a wide spectrum of issues. In light of this set of 
observations I expect to find that policy reflects a low level of threat detection.
The question is whether intelligence will have similar or different narrative 
structures from policy: that is to say different content, sentiment, keywords, 
geographic focus, and ultimately, a different level of threat perception.
Table 2 Refining the hypothesis
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Policy - low threat Policy - high threat
Intelligence - low threat agreement disconnection
Intelligence - high threat disconnection agreement
Given U.S. Arctic behavior over the last several years, I hypothesize that, 
like U.S. Arctic policy, discourse in U.S. intelligence will not have securitized 
Russian engagement in the Arctic. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that 
actors in the intelligence and policy arenas share information on the Arctic. The 
lack of U.S. federal budgetary expenditure for Arctic security during this time 
period supports these assumptions and predictions. A high level of threat 
detected by intelligence likely would have resulted in budgetary support for Arctic 
security. I hypothesize that the intelligence community did not securitize Russian 
engagement in the Arctic, just as the policy-making community did not securitize 
Russia’s behavior in the Arctic.
To understand the discourse taking place in these data sources the 
research methods must detect patterns in text, must be able to pull out and 
examine signifiers of threat and risk, and must trace pathways of transmission: 
how was this information about Russia, the Arctic, and degrees of threat 
disseminated? I rely on critical discourse analysis and the principles of discourse 
theory to examine and characterize the discourse surrounding U.S. perceptions 
of Russian engagement in the Arctic.
Discourse theory applies because the dataset consists of text-based 
documents from a private intelligence firm and the State Department that are 
viewed here as digital conversations. As a whole, I treat this dataset as one 
section of a larger discourse occurring in intelligence circles and within the 
federal government in which a consensus on the level of Russian threat from its 
Arctic ambitions emerges. Capturing the nature of the discourse, that is to say, 
discerning who was included in the conversation and what terms the intelligence 
community applied to the conversation, and looking for any signifiers of threat or 
risk in the text as perceived by the people involved in the conversation, will 
produce answers to this project’s research questions. In short, a thorough 
examination of the discourse documented by this dataset will shed light on 
questions about securitization and the level of agreement between intelligence 
circles and policy-making circles on perceived threats in Russia’s Arctic 
engagement.
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Critical discourse analysis (CDA) considers the power of language and 
discourse to shape ideas and human actions. CDA guides my examination of the 
processes of creation and transmission of the discourse contained in the 
intelligence and policy data, as well as its content. These theories guide inquiry 
into the actors and forces that shape the text: it is not only the content but also 
the creators, publishers and distributors of this data who cultivate impressions of 
Russia, of threat, of the Arctic, and of U.S. strategic interests at home and 
abroad. The following elaborates on the theories of discourse and critical 
discourse analysis that inform the methods employed in this thesis.
3.2 Why Does Text Have Meaning?
Cultural theorist Stuart Hall writes that discourse "constructs the topic. It 
defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a 
topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about.”1 Discourse theory 
supports the assertion of this research project that digital conversations U.S. 
intelligence community members had about Russian engagement in the Arctic 
formed their understanding of Russia in the Arctic. According to Hall and other 
discourse theorists, discourse drives, rather than reflects, understanding. The 
acts of naming, categorizing, and speaking create meaning and also identity.
Discourse not only informs, it also frames, contextualizes, and creates 
significance. Cultural theorist Michel Foucault defines discourse as " ‘a group of
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1 Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates. Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader (SAGE, 2001), 21.
statements which provide a language for talking about - a way of representing 
the knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular historical moment... ”2 This 
project aims to capture how the U.S. intelligence dataset presented and 
communicated ideas about Russia in the Arctic in the early 2000s. Additionally 
the project examines whether this same discursive position towards Russia 
appeared in U.S. Arctic policy. During this time period, did discursive ideas about 
Russia in the Arctic in the intelligence dataset agree with U.S. policy?
Foucault called this sharing of perception discursive formation. In 
Archaeology of Knowledge he writes that by referring to the same object, even 
statements originating from different contexts form a discourse: "statements 
different in form, and dispersed in time, form a group if they refer to one and the 
same object.”3 In my analysis, I subscribe to this theory that views conversations 
about the same topic as the same conversation, or discourse.
Using an example of discourse on mental illness given in Archaeology of 
Knowledge, Foucault explains that discourse on any topic is "constituted by all 
that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, 
explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, 
and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to 
be taken as its own.”4 However, accessing and coalescing all the discourse in the 
world on Russia’s engagement in the Arctic is impossible. Discourse theory
2 I bi d .
3 Michel Foucault, Archaeology o f Knowledge (Psychology Press, 2002), 35.
4 Ibid.
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allows the examination of patterns and influences in a subset of the entire 
conversation to capture major themes of the conversation. Furthermore this 
project relies on the concept of discursive formations to determine whether 
intelligence sources and policy sources were in agreement on the matter of 
Russia and the Arctic.
Discourse theory, in its definitions of identity-creation through discourse, 
also stresses the significance of excluded ideas: information deemed not a part 
of the discourse. Hall calls this a process of "rules in” and "rules out.”5 The 
separation of ‘in group’ from an ‘out group’; the ways in which discourse is about 
or not about something is one of the foundational concepts of this research 
project. What should be made of the things not said by intelligence community 
members about Russian engagement in the Arctic? What a certain discourse, 
particularly one pertinent to intelligence, which operationalizes knowledge, does 
not mention is as significant as what it does mention. Therefore in addition to 
detecting patterns of text contained in this discourse, I identify pertinent topics 
that are not discussed, places that are not mentioned, ways in which information 
is not classified or categorized, people who are not included in the conversation, 
and so on. While greatly expanding the scope of analysis, these theories about 
othering, creating rules, and shaping what a discourse is "about” or "not about” 
aid this project in understanding the non- securitization of Russian engagement 
in the Arctic in the early 2000s. Examining what the discourse contains and what
5 Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates. Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader (SAGE, 2001), 72.
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it ignores will illuminate: 1) what this discourse is about, and 2) whether risk was 
or was not attributed to Russian actions. Moreover, careful analysis of content 
will identify the level of threat detected from Russian engagement in the Arctic 
during this time.
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3.3 Are Threat and Risk Communicated in Special Ways?
Despite Russia’s overt activities in the Arctic, and despite the U.S. having 
one of the most vast intelligence networks in the world, the U.S. is only slowly 
beginning to securitize Russian behavior in the Arctic in late 2015. On November 
10, 2015 Secretary of State John Kerry said, "Our future national security 
strategy is going to be affected also by what’s going on in the A rc tic ..
Economic riches tend to attract military interest as nations seek to ensure their 
own rights are protected. And we know, because we track it, that these countries 
-  like Russia, China, and others -  are active in the Arctic.”6 Alaska senators Lisa 
Murkowski and Dan Sullivan have been calling for such higher-level engagement 
in Arctic security issues for some time. Earlier in the year, during a May 2015 
hearing for the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, Secretary of 
Defense Ash Carter acknowledged that the U.S. was "late in recognizing”7 the 
strategic importance of the Arctic and Russia’s intentions there. Army General 
Martin E. Dempsey echoed this sentiment by saying, "we really just got started 
on this two years ago,”8 in regard to strategic planning in the Arctic.
For a policymaker or a member of the State Department, at a certain point 
a given topic may enter a new realm, a threatening realm. At this point an event
6 Sec. of State John Kerry, "Remarks on Climate Change and National Security,” U.S.Department o f State, November 10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/249393.htm.
7 "Secretary Carter and General Dempsey Testimony on Defense Department’s 2016 Budget,” C- SPAN.org, May 6 2015, accessed July 6 2015, http://www.c-span.org/video/?325804-1/secretary- carter-general-dempsey-testimony-defense-departments-2016-budget.
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or a potential event becomes perceived as a risk to national security, or becomes 
"securitized.” Take, for example, shoes. Shoes in their daily context are non­
threatening and do not affect national security. After a 2001 attempted shoe 
bombing on an American Airlines flight, shoes on airplanes came to be viewed as 
a risk and potential threat. Since the 2001 incident air travelers have grown 
accustomed to having their shoes x-rayed before they are deemed safe and, 
essentially, de-securitized. The x-raying of shoes in airports is an extension of 
policy that is implemented to protect national security. Security studies and 
discourse overlap in theories about the securitizing speech act.
The Copenhagen School’s Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde 
call the specific language moment vested with the potential to securitize an issue 
the speech act. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue that spoken language, in the 
right setting has the capacity to securitize an issue. The circumstances they 
outline for a successful securitizing speech act include a speaker with 
appropriate authority addressing the right audience in the proper venue at the 
right moment and in the proper manner. Without said authority, words of caution 
and alarm essentially fall on deaf ears. Says Pierre Bourdieu on the matter of the 
speech act, "the performative utterance is destined to fail each time that it is not 
pronounced by a person who has the ‘power’ to pronounce it.”9 He goes on to 
further outline how attempts at securitization without authority will fail: "...the 
success of these operations of social magic - comprised by acts of authority, or,
9 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power. Reprint edition. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 111.
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what amounts to the same thing, authorized acts - is dependent on the 
combination of a systematic set of interdependent conditions which constitute 
social rituals.”10
Ultimately Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde assert that concepts can become 
securitized and spur human action. Nicholas Onuf, in his book World of Our 
Making, examines how repeated speech acts can become social practice. 
Specifically he explores how speech acts become social rules: how ‘constitution’ 
becomes ‘institution.’11 Onuf thus blends constructivist logic with speech act 
theory, and I employ this point of view in this research project. Researchers 
Gavan Duffy and Brian Federking in their 2009 article "Changing the Rules: A 
Speech Act Analysis of the End of the Cold War,” captured how I view the link 
between text/language and government action: "As patterns of speech act 
interaction recur, they become regularized as practices. They may ultimately 
become codified as social rules, collections of which comprise institutions. 
Speech acts (construed broadly to include nonverbal acts that convey meaning)
thereby serve as the foundational medium of the co-constitution of agents and
12structure.”12
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10 Ibid.
11 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World o f Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).
12 Gavan Duffy, and Brian Frederking, "Changing the Rules: A Speech Act Analysis of the End of the Cold War,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2009): 325-47, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27735099.
For example, President George Bush’s 2003 State of the Union speech 
about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction in which he said the now infamous 
sixteen words "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein 
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa”13 could be viewed 
as a prime example of a securitizing speech act. In this moment, the Bush 
administration gained the authority from its citizens and, simultaneously, 
justification before the world to engage in war in Iraq. The fact that this statement 
was later proven false only further supports the argument for the potency of the 
securitizing speech act. In the right circumstance a speech act can be so 
effective that it does not even need to be true in order to justify, for example, 
decades of war costing trillions of dollars. This raises the question of whether the 
U.S.’s failure to securitize Russian engagement in the Arctic can be seen as a 
failed speech act.
Theorist Judith Butler sees the speech act in a less monolithic way than 
her counterparts in Copenhagen. In her article "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech” 
she questions one of the fundaments of Buzan et al’s securitizing speech act 
theory: the capacity of words to be actions. In "Burning Acts” Butler responds to 
J. L. Austin’s formative How to Do Things with Words, in which Butler examines 
the capacity of words to be, in and of themselves, actions. Butler interprets 
Austinian logic to view the speaker as the doer, when she writes "The subject as 
sovereign is presumed in the Austinian account. the figure for the one who
13 "President Delivers ‘State of the Union,’” George Bush Whitehouse Archives, January 28 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
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speaks and, in speaking, performs what she/he speaks, is the judge or some 
other representative of the law.”14 It is however the notion that the words 
themselves do action that Butler describes as the "apparent coincidence of 
signifying and enacting.”15 Butler, building on Austin’s seminal example, 
examines the relationship between words and action in much of her work; these 
theories support this research in achieving its goal of equating the words of 
intelligence and policy with the actions of the U.S. government.
Butler’s work in Excitable Speech continues with the examination of word 
and deed. However in the passage that follows she considers the limits of the 
power of the speaker: "...the act of a speaking body, is always to some extent 
unknowing about what it performs, that it always says something that it does not 
intend, and that it is not the emblem of mastery or control that it sometimes 
purports to be.”16 Could, as Butler points out, the intelligence "speaking body” in 
this dataset have been the unknowing, un-masterful body? Could intelligence 
speech acts have been saying something ‘it (did) not intend’, and did this result in 
the U.S.’ non-securitized stance on Russian engagement in the Arctic? Or could 
the IC have failed to clearly articulate a threat it did perceive? Or, alternatively,
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14Judith Butler, "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech,” The University o f Chicago Law Roundtable: A Journal o f Interdisciplinary Legal Studies 3,1, Article 9 (1996), 203, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol3/iss1Z9.
15 Ibid, 200.
16Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics o f the Performative, (New York: Routledge, 1997),
10,http://monoskop.org/images/5/54/Butler Judith Excitable Speech A Politics of the Performative 1997.pdf.
along the vein of the inquiry in Burning Acts, do the words themselves do the 
action?
Careful examination of the dataset suggests that in the United States in 
the early 2000s, neither intelligence sources nor policy-making sources issued a 
speech act that securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic. Nor does the 
dataset reveal any "unsuccessful” securitizing speech act, at least not on the part 
of U.S. sources that are the focus of this research. Nor was there an unintended, 
"un-masterful” securitization by U.S. sources of Russian engagement in the 
Arctic. The matter of locus of action and of doing, however, raises an interesting 
question. If U.S. engagement is marked by inaction, and the language itself is 
passive, perhaps Butler’s theory sheds light on how words become government 
action. The question that remains, a question that is beyond the scope of this 
project, is whether these two communities were right in their threat assessments.
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3.4 What Does a Securitizing Speech Act Look Like as Text?
This project assumes that I can identify and profile a securitized statement 
in a large amount of text. Yet securitization theory created by the Copenhagen 
School is not a practitioner’s theory, and little research has been done to 
systematically identify methods for identifying securitizing speech acts. NSF- 
commissioned research in 1980 attempted to reconcile speech act theory with 
natural language processing,17 however the attempt exposed the limitations of 
the theory in practice in artificial intelligence (AI) and computational linguistics.
To complicate the matter, the Copenhagen School views securitization as 
inherently inter-subjective. Securitizing speech acts require multiple actors to 
engage with one another and acknowledge perception of threat. That is, 
securitizing speech acts require consent of the audience in accepting the security 
risk conveyed by the speaker. In this research project the audience is intelligence 
actors and the policy-maker.
In this project ‘security-speak’ is identified through multiple processes. The 
analytical tools are designed to identify trends and patterns, but they would not 
be appropriate for finding one, specific speech act. Instead the project employs 
theory to determine whether large-scale securitization has or has not occurred. 
For context, in 2010 journalist and data visualization expert Jonathan Stray 
visualized the Iraqi Warlogs released by Wikileaks. The visualization and 
analysis of Stray’s team starkly differs in content from the data analyzed for this
17 William C. Mann, "Toward a Speech Act Theory for Natural Language Processing,” University Of Southern California - Marina Del Rey Information Sciences Institute, 1980, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA087250.
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research project. Key terms detected in Stray’s analysis18 included words: 
mortar, civ killed shot, injured, handcuffed, blindfolded, corpse, abducted, and 
detonated. Stray’s analysis unequivocally captures the nature of these 
documents: records of war that detail the nature and cause of human casualties. 
This constitutes what could be called post-securitized speech, because it 
describes not the moments in which Iraq became a security concern for the U.S., 
but the moments of cataloging active warfare.
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10, 2010, http://jonathanstray.com/a-full-text-visualization-of-the-iraq-war-logs.
3.5 What Would Securitization Look Like in This Research Project?
For this project I look for words that communicate fear, mistrust, and 
perceptions of threat or risk: language that, unlike Stray’s work mentioned above, 
pre-dates and spurs armed conflict or the end of politics as usual. This includes 
words that capture tension such as: argue, attack, terror, fear, risk, threat, crisis, 
criticism, corrupt, conflict, defense, security, destroy, fight, grievance, hazard, 
and so on, are a part of the analysis. It is the language of tension, of discord, that 
will allow the analyst to dig deeper into the line-by-line text to discern securitized 
or non-securitized speech.
A pattern of securitized discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic 
would be consistently tagged by document creators/senders as a defense or 
security issue, and would be communicated directly to and consistently with key 
defense and security actors at high frequency. A securitized discourse would be 
highly focused on Russian political and military actors and on developments in 
the geographic region of the Russian Arctic. To counter developments in Russian 
locations, operatives would discuss American Arctic defense capabilities, in the 
U.S. Arctic or through partnerships with Canada / NORAD, Iceland, NATO, and 
others. The securitized discourse would be negative in sentiment due to the 
centrality of words about threat and risk to the discourse. Widespread patterns 
representing perceptions of threat and risk would convince me that a securitized 
discourse was taking place.
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3.6 Why Would the United States Securitize Russian Engagement in the
Arctic?
To delve deeper into the theory that frames this research, it is useful to 
examine which issues would drive the U.S. to securitize Russian involvement in 
the Arctic. Thus far I have outlined the pertinent issues related to intelligence,
U.S. Arctic policy, communication between intelligence and policy, the role of 
language in shaping human perception, the securitizing speech act and 
Foucauldian ideas about discursive formations. This section explores why the 
U.S. would securitize Russian engagement in the Arctic region.
A "security” issue threatens the identity of the state, the sovereign territory 
of the state, or the strategic interests of the state. These issues could be 
economic, they could threaten the values of the state, or they could threaten the 
values of key constituents or stakeholder groups. What constitutes a security 
issue has expanded in the last few decades to incorporate the role of "soft” (non­
military) issues. For the U.S., the following "soft” concerns could potentially 
become security issues in the Arctic: indigenous rights, environmental protection, 
commercial fishing rights, oil and gas exploration, and sovereign territory, to 
name a few. Fear or distrust of Russia by U.S. citizens, spurred on by negative 
media coverage, could also securitize an issue. Hard security issues that would 
affect the security dynamic include military build-up that creates a marked 
imbalance of offensive power between the two nations, or that lowers the level of 
trust between Russia and the U.S. (or U.S. allies).
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While most Arctic security experts19 argue that there will never be literal or 
land warfare in the geographic area of the Arctic, Russian engagement in the 
Arctic could still become securitized. Securitization does not always mean armed 
conflict, but the threat of armed conflict becomes more likely once an issue is 
securitized. With that in mind, it is noteworthy that many of the aforementioned 
soft concerns and hard security interests of the U.S. in the Arctic listed above 
had already been identified during the time frame examined for this research 
project.
Russia had already begun to develop its military infrastructure in the 
Arctic, increasing the imbalance between U.S. and Russian military capacity. The 
U.S. media had already begun to register alarm over Russian Arctic 
engagement. Russian encroachment on other states’ territories and illegal fishing 
in the Arctic has been well documented. Russia’s poor environmental standards 
and improper handling of Soviet era nuclear and other hazardous waste has 
already polluted Arctic waterways and air space, and Russia has shown little 
initiative in mitigating these issues. The potential for securitization is high, yet 
U.S. response to these developments remains muted.
A contemporary example of an issue that has become securitized but 
remains an unarmed-conflict is China’s development in the South China Sea 
(SCS). Similarities abound between China’s behavior in the SCS and Russia’s
19 See for example the 2008 Department of National Intelligence report "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” the 2011 Department of Defense "Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage” or the 2014 report from Center for a New American Security, "Emerging Arctic Security Challenges”
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behavior in the Arctic. These similarities include conflicting views over: fishing 
rights, maritime boundaries, military and civilian developments that displace trust 
with neighbors, the role of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and freedom of navigation, ambiguous legal frameworks, and the 
potential for oil and gas resource development. Scholars such as Erik Franckx in 
Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and American 
Perspectives, Michael Byers, in the 2014 article "The UN and the Law of the Sea: 
From the Arctic to the South China Sea,” Nong Hong and co-editors of the 2015 
book UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the South China Sea, and others 
are beginning to consider the similarities between Russia’s behavior in the Arctic 
and China’s behavior in the SCS. Despite multiple similarities, the U.S. has taken 
a harder stance toward China’s behavior in the SCS than it has to Russia’s 
engagement in the Arctic. The U.S. has flown reconnaissance missions and sent 
multiple Navy surveillance missions in this disputed area, vigorously asserting 
the U.S. position that UNCLOS does not "negate[s] the right of military forces of 
all nations to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 
without coastal state notice or consent.”20 This behavior has angered the 
Chinese, and has resulted in multiple incidents that could spark armed conflict 
between the two powers. Writes maritime scholar Felix Chang for the Foreign 
Policy Research Institute’s blog Geopoliticus in May of 2015, " . th e  United
20 Bonnie Glaser, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea - Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012, http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south- china-sea/p27883#.
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States also revealed that it is considering sending its ships and surveillance 
aircraft within 12 nautical miles-the internationally recognized territorial zone 
around natural islands- of China’s newly-built islands ... if that happens, an 
incident between U.S. and Chinese forces may well take place.”21 After the 
publication of Chang’s article the U.S. sent B-52 bombers into the region, 
sending a strong signal to Beijing about U.S. views.
In contrast, the U.S. has taken no such action in the Russian Arctic or in 
response to Russian Arctic claims, which also include a dispute about freedom of 
navigation. Instead, Russian bombers buzz U.S. and NATO airspace. The U.S. 
still aspires, at least in public statements, to maintain cooperation with Russia in 
the Arctic. The U.S. has securitized, but not engaged in conflict with China with 
regard to its actions in South China Sea. By comparison U.S. behavior towards 
Russia in response to Russian engagement in the Arctic has not been as strong.
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21 Felix Chang, "Ready for a Fight?: How America Could Respond to a South China Sea Crisis,” Geopoliticus, May 2015, http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2015/05/ready-fight-how-america-could- respond-south-china-sea-crisis.
3.7 How Does Discourse Theory Function as Methodology?
This research applies discourse theory by using critical discourse analysis 
in three tiers: micro-, meso-, and macro-level analysis. The micro-level of 
analysis examines content patterns, essentially asking "what” questions such as: 
what is this data discussing. The meso-level of analysis looks at production and 
distribution practices that surround the data, answering the "how” and "who” 
questions surrounding how this data come to be and who created and read this 
data. The macro-level of analysis examines intertextual dialogue, how these texts 
interact in a discursive fashion. It is in this level of analysis that the U.S. Arctic 
policy documents enter the analytical process. The analysis seeks similarities 
and differences between content of the intelligence dataset and policy dataset. 
This multi-tiered process implemented with the help of a set of analytical tools 
should illuminate consistent trends and patterns in U.S. discourse surrounding 
Russian engagement in the Arctic.
This tiered analysis is necessary because intelligence is simultaneously a 
process and a product. More so, in intelligence both the process and the product 
are governed by complex rules of dissemination (commonly called 
"classification”) that restrict access and control flows of communication. In a 
2012 article "Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do 
about Them?” in Intelligence and National Security, Mark Jensen cites faulty 
process as one of the three foundational concepts most likely to result in
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intelligence failure.22 He stresses the process that creates successful or failed 
intelligence. Therefore it is important to examine the process of intelligence 
creation to assay discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic. This 
thinking is supported by theory. In Questions of Method Michel Foucault 
describes how analysis is shaped by many factors, including the process by 
which the analysis itself is created. Careful analysis must, according to Foucault, 
include both a critique of the analytical process, and all adjoining territory of 
influence upon the analysis. This research project employs a multi-tiered 
approach that stresses the significance of discourse formation in order to honor 
these conceptual requirements.
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22 Mark A. Jensen, "Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?,” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 261-82, doi :10.1080/02684527.2012.661646.
Chapter 4 Data
This research examines U.S. perceptions of Russia in the Arctic that 
originate in the intelligence and policy-maker communities in an attempt to 
understand U.S. non-engagement in the Arctic. To extract meaning from this 
text-based dataset I use discourse theory and critical discourse analysis. These 
theoretical frameworks should illuminate widespread patterns in content and in 
classification of the data that answer the question of whether intelligence 
securitzed Russia’s actions in the Arctic.
The data set spans the years from 2004 to 2015 and includes 600+ 
documents comprised of official U.S. Arctic policy, internal emails of a private 
U.S. intelligence firm, and diplomatic cables from the State Department. In their 
entirety they comprise 1,468,509 words and roughly 3,000 typed pages. This 
dataset is made available through the actions of the hacker group Anonymous 
and leaker Pfc. Chelsea Manning in coordination with the government 
transparency site Wikileaks. The three sources create a comprehensive slice of 
U.S. discourse about Russia in the Arctic and are private or classified information 
that is traceable to its sources. That being said, intelligence solely from defense 
agencies could strengthen the research performed here; however none was 
publically available. En masse, the data helps to profile U.S. perceptions of 
Russian engagement in the Arctic.
Data visualization and analysis softwares Overview and Textexture 
support content analysis of this large dataset. Text-mining tools Aylien and 
AlchemyAPI break the dataset into entities, identify key contexts and provide
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sentiment categories of positive, negative, and neutral sentiment. The mapping 
program CartoDB visualizes locations (also referred to as location entities) 
mentioned in the dataset.
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4.1 Data Origins and Cleaning 
The dataset is comprised of 151 cables from the State Department and 
508 emails from the private intelligence firm Stratfor. These 659 documents 
originate from two large-scale leaks published by the pro-transparency 
organization Wikileaks that, combined, include several million documents. The 
Stratfor emails are part of the Wikileaks collection the "Global Intelligence Files” 
(GI Files). The State Department cables are part of the Wikileaks "Cablegate” 
collection that is housed in their Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy (PlusD).
I selected these documents because they include the words "Arctic” and 
"Russia,” and because they were accessible for extraction from the Wikileaks site 
with the tools and skills available. The keywords "Arctic” and "Russia” returned 
intelligence that was not solely about Russia or the Arctic, but pertained to both 
topics of study for this project. These broad terms allowed for a wide net to be 
cast ensuring enough data for meaningful analysis. This dataset offers insight 
into how a private and a government U.S. intelligence group create narratives 
about Russia in the Arctic.
The emails from the GI Files used for this thesis are mostly open source 
intelligence collection. Open Source intelligence (OSINT) is material gathered 
from publicly available information such as news reports. Stratfor internally 
describes open source as "stuff that’s on the internet”1 and "information from the
1 "The Stratfor Glossary of Useful, Baffling and Strange Intelligence Terms,” Wikileaks, accessed March 20, 2015,https://wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/The Stratfor Glossary of Useful Baffling and Strange Intelligenc e Terms.pdf.
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public domain circulated and discussed among all employees.”2 Many of these 
emails are compilations of news media articles on pre-identified topics that 
regional monitors send to internal email listings for broad distribution.
The documents from the CableGate collection are diplomatic cables, most 
of which are designated "unclassified.” These cables are written by State 
Department personnel and sent to consulates, embassies, missions and other 
U.S. government officials and agencies. The CableGate collection was taken by 
the now-imprisoned leaker Pfc. Chelsea Manning3 from the U.S. closed 
communication network SIPRNet.
In the GI Files leak, 11,404 emails contain the words "Arctic” and 
"Russia.” From the Cablegate leak, 155 cables contain the words "Arctic” and 
"Russia.” The eligible dataset for this research project includes a total of 11,559 
leaked emails and cables; however only 659 documents from the two collections 
are analyzed for this study. While still a significantly sized collection in its own 
right, the two main reasons for this considerably smaller dataset are technical 
limitations and duplications that will be explained further below.
48
2 Sarah Harrison, "The Global Intelligence Files,” Wikileaks, accessed January 15, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html.
3 "United States Diplomatic Cables Leak,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, July 7, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United States diplomatic cables leak&oldid=670346864.
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Figure 1 Data Cleaning Process
The data cleaning process involved several software programs. These
programs extracted the data from the source Wikileaks, cleaned the data and
transformed it into the right format for upload to five main programs for analysis.
The flow diagram below outlines this process.
The table below documents the data management process that determined the 
final size of the dataset.
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Table 3 Data Cleaning Process
Step in process Detail # of docs (GI Files/C'gate)
Identification of documents Documents in Wikileaks' GI Files and Cablegate collections with search words “Arctic” and “Russia” 11,559(11404/155)
Extraction • Import.io webcrawler finds and extracts 171 Cablegate documents (more than human-identified 155)
• The number of GI Files documents extracted was affected by Wikileaks' limitation of returning only 1,000 (out of 11,404) search records.
• Import.io only returned 980 of these 1,000 identified documents.
1,151(980/171)
Deletion of duplicates • 187 of the GI Files were duplicate emails, meaning they had the exact same sender, receiver, send date, release date, title and content.
• The Cablegate documents had no duplicates.
964(793/171)
Exclusion of Attachments • 440 emails from the GI Files contained attachments with content in them that is unextractable using the Import.io software. To note, 13 of these emails comprised a total of 84 of the duplicates mentioned above
• The Cablegate documents had no attachments.
679(508/171)
Documents with large amounts of text
• In the GI Files no deletions were made because of large amounts of text
• In Cablegate three documents with excessive amounts of text were deleted for the upload process to the Overview program
676(508/168)
“Arctic” or Arctic content After uploading to Overview program it is discovered that not all documents contain the word “Arctic” in the body of the text. This can be explained by the fact that they may have contained the word Arctic in the document title, which was not included in the metadata of the upload to Overview
• From GI Files only 384 documents specifically contain the word Arctic; however review shows that most documents that do not make use of the word “Arctic” are still relevant to Arctic issues.
• From Cablegate 150 documents specifically contain the word “Arctic” and one document refers to the Arctic without specific use of the word.
659(508/151)
FINAL 659
While the strengths of this dataset include access to classified and private 
documents that help capture a discourse at a unique moment in Arctic political 
history, this research project explores U.S. securitization (or lack thereof) of 
Russian engagement in the Arctic. These documents stem from a private 
intelligence firm, and the State Department, primarily foreign policy bodies of the 
United States. The data set does not include a cache of documents from the 
primary defense and intelligence bodies of the United States, such as the 
Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and others. 
Access to such documents would be helpful for further research certainly, but 
they were not available for study as they are classified and hence inaccessible.
In summary, this research project analyzes 659 text documents from 
Wikileaks' GI Files and Cablegate collections containing the words “Arctic” and 
“Russia.” After the initial identification of eligible documents, the process of 
extracting and cleaning data ultimately determined the size of the dataset 
analyzed in this project.
4.1.1 Overview of the Data Chapter
This section examines the intelligence and policy data using a three-tiered 
process of analysis. In order to detect patterns of discourse I processed this text- 
based data set using a host of analytical tools and approaches. The approaches 
include content analysis and sentiment analysis methods. The overarching 
analysis is guided by critical discourse analysis. Data analytics and visualization 
tools implement this three-tiered analytical approach, and ultimately these
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software tools dissect the massive amount of raw text. This multi-faceted 
approach allows for the data to reveal various patterns and trends, and provides 
a rich picture of U.S. discourse surrounding Russian engagement in the Arctic.
In reality what I refer to as “the dataset” in this project is actually a 
collection of three very different data sources. These three different sources 
allow me to view differences and similarities in the discourse, and to draw out 
large-scale patterns that take place in all three data sources. The three sources 
are internal emails from the U.S. private intelligence firm Stratfor, State 
Department cables, and U.S. Arctic policy documents. This study analyzes the 
dataset using Norman Fairclough's prescribed CDA method of three-tiered 
analysis. First, the meso-level of analysis investigates the origins of the dataset. 
The investigation of origins includes answering questions about the publishing 
process including how this “secret” data became available to the world; the 
distribution process, including who was in charge of disseminating this data set, 
to whom, and why; and the production process, including who created these 
data.4 The answers to these questions should reveal a set of influencers upon 
the dataset that contribute to the discourse at hand, as the motives for creation, 
internal distribution, and publishing are intrinsic to the nature of the discourse.
At the meso-level of analysis, I will explain how Wikileaks, Anonymous, 
and Pfc. Chelsea Manning contributed to publishing and distributing the dataset 
to the global public. This portion of the data chapter also serves to validate the
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4 Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (Harlow, England ; New York: Routledge, 2001), Chapter 7.
dataset as “authentic” communication, which in this case means unadulterated, 
original digital files. The meso-level of analysis then takes the analysis one layer 
deeper to examine production procedures, policies and other influencers 
surrounding the creation of the documents in the dataset by Stratfor employees 
and State Department officials. This stage includes detecting patterns of sending 
and receiving, comparing trends in dates of communication and categorization, 
and defining general nomenclature for categorization and classification. A 
preliminary sketch of the discourse in this dataset emerges from the meso-level 
analysis, which subsequent tiers of analysis should substantiate and reinforce. 
Patterns detected through the meso-level of analysis include a trend toward low- 
level of classification and open source intelligence, and a trend toward viewing 
Russia in the Arctic as a political, rather than national security, affair, both of 
which reinforce this project's hypothesis of a low-level of threat detected from 
Russia.
The second major inquiry in this chapter provides the micro-level analysis, 
which examines the content and sentiment of the emails and cables themselves. 
This process is modeled after Norman Fairclough's writings on the practical 
application of critical discourse analysis (CDA).5 Here I employ data analysis 
tools for text to analyze text-based content patterns, networks of words, and 
sentiment of the documents. These tools allow me to detect widespread patterns 
of content and sentiment that shape the discourse of threat posed by Russian 
engagement in the Arctic.
5 Ibid, Chapter 5
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Analysis of content is the foundation of the micro-level inquiry. Content 
analysis performed with the help of data analytics and data visualization tools 
aims to reveal major themes in the text. Content analysis systematically seeks 
understanding in text, and the software tools employed here allow for a 
dashboard view of patterns across the large base of text in the data set. The 
content analysis will help determine the nature of U.S. IC discourse about 
Russian engagement in the Arctic.
One specific type of content that provides insight into the nature of this 
discourse is references to geographic locations. All geographic locations 
mentioned in the IC dataset are mapped. The resulting map is a significant 
portion of this micro-level of analysis because it illuminates trends of geographic 
focus, as well as areas that are not a focus of this discourse.
Additionally, I employ sentiment analysis to expand understanding of the 
nature of the discourse. Sentiment analysis uses text-mining principles with 
algorithmic weightings applied to language expressing sentiment and opinion. 
These algorithms are built around banks of words that represent sentiment, 
emotion and opinion, and natural language processing (NLP), which allows 
software to identify intention in human language. The program will identify 
whether a document has negative, positive, or neutral sentiment, which in turn 
will capture perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic. For example, a 
large cache of negative sentiment documents which share content about the 
Prirazlomnoye oil rig or President Dimitry Medvedev would reveal U.S. 
intelligence perceptions of Russian motives and actions. This process provides
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an objective and repeatable valuation of sentiment, which, combined with content 
analysis, can provide much insight into discursive patterns.
The final phase of this data chapter examines intertextual dialog between 
the intelligence data set and the Arctic policy documents. This macro-level 
analysis aims to find consistent patterns and similarities between sentiment and 
content in U.S. Arctic intelligence and U.S. Arctic policy documents. To do so, 
first the policy documents are put through a micro-level analysis. The resulting 
profile is compared with the findings of the micro-level analysis of the intelligence 
documents to create an understanding of the intertextual dialog, or the macro­
level of analysis. By comparing content, location entities, and document 
sentiment patterns between the IC dataset and policy documents, I can 
hypothesize about a shared discursive stance (and pinpoint major divergences) 
to complete the picture of shared threat valuation between the IC and policy­
making communities.
4.2 Meso-Level Analysis 
The meso-level analysis is broken into two main sections on distribution 
and production. The Distribution section includes Wikileaks as Publisher, 
describing the illegal conditions under which these leaks became part of the 
public commons and Controversy and Significance that explores the veracity of 
the data set. Using evidence culled from metadata, the Production section 
examines influences shaping the creation of this data. A summary of findings
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concludes this section on meso-analysis with real-world corroborations of 
findings.
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4.2.1 Distribution
4.2.1.1 Wikileaks as Publisher 
The intelligence portion of this dataset is available through the 
organization Wikileaks and its website www.wikileaks.org. Wikileaks was 
founded in 2006 and has been described as everything from a nonprofit online 
media organization6 to a terrorist organization.7 Wikileaks' stated purpose is to 
improve government transparency. It pursues this goal by obtaining and 
publishing state secrets in an accessible and searchable forum via its website.
Wikileaks obtains its classified information (“leaks”) from anonymous 
sources. Its most famous leaks have included the “2010 Collateral Murder” leak 
that published dashboard video footage from a U.S. Apache helicopter that 
captured the murder of civilians and journalists in Iraq,8 the “Iraq Warlogs” leak,9 
the “Afghan Warlogs”10 leak, and the “2012 Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy” 
(PlusD) leak that published stolen State Department diplomatic cables. The 
Cablegate Collection analyzed in this research project is a part of the PlusD leak.
6 Micah L. Sifry and Andrew Rasiej, WikiLeaks and the Age o f Transparency, (Counterpoint,
2 0 11 ) 2 1 .
7 Declan McCullagh, “Congressman Wants WikiLeaks Listed as Terrorist Group,” CNET, November 28, 2010, Accessed March 26, 2015, http://www .cnet.com/news/congress man-wants- wikileaks-listed-as-terrorist-group/.
8 The video can be seen on YouTube here. The soldier responsible for this attack speaks about the incident and its aftermath here.
9 Almost 400,000 United States Army field reports from 2004 - 2009 from combat activities in Iraq, released by Wikileaks in 2010
10 Approximately 91,000 United States Army field reports from 2004 - 2009 from combat activities in Afghanistan, released by Wikileaks in 2010
US State Department fury over the PlusD leak stemmed from fears of 
jeopardizing the safety of field operatives and active intelligence collection efforts 
and the leak's potential damage to diplomatic ties between nations. Der Spiegel 
wrote of the leak's potentially devastating significance: “Never before in history 
has a superpower lost control of such vast amounts of such sensitive information 
-- data that can help paint a picture of the foundation upon which U.S. foreign 
policy is built.”11 Needless to say, as an organization intent on exposing state 
secrets, Wikileaks has been at the center of much controversy since its inception. 
This controversy includes legal and criminal proceedings. The U.S. Justice 
Department is engaged in an ongoing criminal investigation into Wikileaks, an
investigation that includes a grand jury exploration of Wikileaks and its founder
12Julian Assange under the Espionage Act.12
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11 “The US Diplomatic Leaks: A Superpower's View of the World,” Spiegel Online, November 28, 2010, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-us-diplomatic-leaks-a- superpower-s-view-of-the-world-a-731580.html.
12 Ed Pilkington, “WikiLeaks: US Opens Grand Jury Hearing,” The Guardian, May 11 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2 0 11 /may/1 1 /us-opens-wikileaks-grand-jury-hearing.
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4.2.2.2 Controversy and Significance: The Global Intelligence Files 
At a minimum there are two steps required to successfully execute a leak. 
Firstly, the secret/classified/private information must be obtained. Secondly, the 
information must be made publicly available. In the case of the Global 
Intelligence Files, the leak was perpetrated in the winter of 2011 by hackers who 
claim to be part of the online activist group Anonymous. The contents of the leak; 
five million13 internal emails of the private intelligence firm Stratfor sent between 
2004 and 2011, were subsequently published by Wikileaks under the moniker 
“The Global Intelligence Files.” Wikileaks began releasing the GI Files in 
February of 2012.14 The selection used for this research study was released in 
spurts throughout 2012 and 2013.
Like most actions taken by Anonymous and Wikileaks the releases 
generated controversy. George Friedman, CEO of Stratfor, took to the Stratfor 
website in January 2011 to publicly address the hack. According to Friedman 
there were two breaches in December of 2011 that included theft of client credit 
card information, theft of internal emails, and the destruction of four Stratfor data 
servers and backup archives.15 Friedman also used the public site to address the
13 Sarah Harrison, “The Global Intelligence Files,” Wikileaks, accessed January 15, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html.
14 “2012-13 Stratfor Email Leak,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, July 16, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2012%E2%80%9313 Stratfor email leak&oldid=6717 07116. and Sarah Harrison, “The Global Intelligence Files,” Wikileaks, accessed January 15, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/the-gifiles.html.
15 George Friedman, “The Hack on Stratfor,” Stratfor, accessed March 20, 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/hack-stratfor.
conspiracy theories about Stratfor that surfaced (in part propagated by Wikileaks) 
as a result of the attack. “We are what we said we were,” Friedman writes, “an 
organization that generates its revenues through geopolitical analysis. At the 
core of our business, we objectively acquire, organize, analyze and distribute 
information.”16 Because Stratfor is just one of several private intelligence firms, 
some speculate that it was specifically targeted by Wikileaks for its role in 
assisting the U.S. government in collecting information on Wikileaks itself for a 
large and ongoing trial. Nothing is known with certainty about the motives of the 
hackers claiming to be from the activist group Anonymous. On the day after the 
second Stratfor breach the New York Times reported that “the breach appears to 
have been conducted in retaliation for the arrest and imprisonment of Pfc.
Bradley [now Chelsea] Manning,”17 as well as to discredit the security and 
intelligence firm for being vulnerable to attack.
While Wikileaks asserts that the GI Files are “...a sinister catalog of 
surveillance [Stratfor] efforts,” researcher Lisa Lynch found that news media
predominantly used the GI Files to document what journalists saw as “the
18ineptitude of the well-connected private intelligence firm.”18 For example, 
journalist Pratap Chatterjee, who specializes in writing about what he calls the 
intelligence-industrial cartel, wrote for the Guardian that the true significance of
16 ibid.
17 Nicole Perlroth, “Hackers Breach the Web Site of Stratfor Global Intelligence,” The New York Times, December 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/technology/hackers-breach-the- web-site-of-stratfor-global-intelligence.html.
18 Lisa Lynch, “Wikileaks After Megaleaks,” Digital Journalism 1, no. 3 (October 1, 2013): 314-34, doi :10.1080/21670811.2013.816544.
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the Stratfor leak was the “...extremely low quality of the information available to 
the highest bidder.”19 Hal Berghel, academic and columnist for Computer 
Magazine, wrote on the first anniversary of the breach: “Firstly, I'm not convinced 
that Stratfor's approach to intelligence analytics will lead to significantly better 
decision making than we've come to expect from the military industrial complex 
... Secondly I'm bothered by the lack of oversight and transparency in the 
process.”20 Journalists have not historically used the collection in the manner 
Wikileaks perhaps intended when the organization published Stratfor's internal 
communications online, that is, to expose corrupt practices and questionable 
access to U.S. government agencies.
Despite public critique of Stratfor's analytical procedures21 and concern 
over the nature of its access to government agencies and multinational 
corporations, there has been little to no dispute as to the veracity of the 
documents leaked. For the purpose of this project, the dataset will not be 
discounted for the controversy that surrounds it, nor judged by the quality of its 
analysis. CEO George Friedman's letter on Stratfor's website verified the leak. In 
the cloud of controversy surrounding the circumstances of the leak, the lack of 
debate about the veracity of these documents essentially confirms that this
19 “WikiLeaks' Stratfor Dump Lifts Lid on Intelligence-Industrial Complex,” The Guardian,February 28, 2012, sec. US news,http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/28/wikileaks-intelligence-industrial-complex.
20 Hal Berghel, “Stratfor or Stratagainst.” Computer Magazine, 2012.
21 Max Fisher, “Stratfor Is a Joke and So Is Wikileaks for Taking It Seriously,” The Atlantic, February 27, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/stratfor-is-a-joke-
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and-so-is-wikileaks-for-taking-it-seriously/253681/.
collection is authentic and unedited email communication among Stratfor 
employees.
This collection is useful because it documents uncensored content, 
sentiment and discourse about Russia's engagement in the Arctic as well as 
documenting the analytical process of employees at a large intelligence firm that 
is used widely by stakeholders in the U.S. government. The GI Files are of 
particular use for this research project because they are:
• Publicly-available internal conversations 
o Created for internal consumption, and
o Written in uncouched, conversational language that includes 
discussion and opinion,
• Show “how the sausage is made;”
o Demonstrate the process of intelligence collection, 
o Document the process of creating intelligence products,
• Text-based and
o Can be attributed to individual intelligence analysts, 
o Document evolving discourse,
o Contain metadata about dates and sender / receiver information. 
The GI Files are valuable because they document private conversations that are 
part of the analytical process at Stratfor. As text-based digital data they lend 
themselves easily to analysis using data tools. The metadata attributed to the 
sender and receiver, and date stamping that is a part of all email communication 
provides an added layer of information for analysis.
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4.2.2.3 Controversy and Significance: The Cablegate Collection
The Cablegate files are part of a 250,000-document leak perpetrated by 
Chelsea Manning. This data leaked by Manning in 2011 put Wikileaks at the 
forefront of the national debate about whistleblowing and state secrets. The 
military and the federal government hold that such activities are treasonous, and 
the world has witnessed the legal implications of such leaks. Pfc. Chelsea 
Manning is currently incarcerated and serving a 35-year sentence for leaking the 
Cablegate documents,22 and Wikileaks founder Julian Assange has spent over 
three years hiding in the Ecuadorian embassy in London.
While one of the main criticisms of Manning's action was that the leak 
jeopardized U.S. government officials and agents worldwide, there has been little 
documented evidence of direct harm to a field operative or official as a result of 
the leak.23 Manning stated in her arraignment “I only wanted to help people. I 
will serve my time knowing that sometimes you have to pay a heavy price to live 
in a free society.”24 While historically a leaker has acted to expose a specific 
issue about which the leaker has intimate and insider knowledge, in an age when 
data collection reaches epic proportions, leakers such as Manning are able to
22 Charlie Savage and Emmarie Huetteman, “Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal Leak of U.S. Files,” The New York Times, August 21 2013,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/manning-sentenced-for-leaking-government-secrets.html.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
execute “megaleaks” or “deluge leaks.”25 These deluge leaks differ from 
traditional leaks in that they are vast data caches with which the leaker has only 
an informal relationship. The relationship between leaker and leaked data may 
simply be that the leaker has access to the data, and no more. According to a UC 
Davis Law Review article written by Margaret Kwoka, the motives for Pfc. 
Manning, and other ‘deluge leakers' likely are “a broad response to excessive 
government secrecy insofar as they reveal a vast array of records about which 
the leaker knows relatively little.” Manning's arraignment statement, and the 
sheer volume of documents in her leak, support the commonly held belief that 
her motive was not to expose one singular government secret, but an 
overarching desire for government transparency. As with the Stratfor leak, there 
has been no documented controversy about the veracity of these cables in the 
PlusD Cablegate collection. The cables in this dataset are used on good faith 
that these are original, un-doctored communications between U.S. State 
Department officials, and thus they document authentic content, sentiment and 
discourse on the Russian Arctic.
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25 Margaret B. Kwoka, “Leaking and Legitimacy,” Social Science Research Network, September 10, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2494375.
4.2.2.4 Distribution: Summary 
Despite its controversial origins, this research project uses a dataset of 
659 leaked intelligence emails and cables containing the words “Arctic” and 
“Russia.” This data was leaked by Anonymous hackers and Pfc. Chelsea 
Manning to the government transparency organization Wikileaks, which 
published the materials on its website. Employees of the private intelligence firm 
Stratfor and U.S. State Department officials created these documents according 
to their own internal guidelines for intelligence collection and analysis. The 
dataset, used here on good faith that they are authentic copies of un-edited 
internal communication within both organizations, reveals the working processes 
and opinions of intelligence community members. The dataset will be analyzed 
using critical discourse analysis in three waves of effort to document discourse 
about the Russian Arctic in a comprehensive manner.
4.2.2 Production 
A tenet of critical discourse analysis is that the means of production 
influence the product. Carefully documenting the decisions and influences that 
shape the process of intelligence gathering and synthesis leads to greater 
understanding of the resultant product: U.S. intelligence on Russian engagement 
in the Arctic. A systematic examination of Stratfor and State Department 
procedures of analysis, the process by which intelligence is produced, follows.
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4.2.2.1 Production: Creating the Global Intelligence Files 
The GI Files collection is predominantly open source intelligence, that is, 
intelligence culled from publicly available, non-classified, non-secret sources. 
Stratfor monitors and watch officers create open source intelligence [OSINT] by 
collecting news items related to political, economic, military, or other spheres that 
seem pertinent to ongoing developments or events or issues of interest. In an 
email about Stratfor's various teams, the OSINT team is described as being: 
“composed of the Watch Officers and Monitors, these are the technicians that 
vacuum up the world's vast amounts of open source intelligence, filter out the
junk, and distribute the good stuff to the company. They're kind of like 49er's
26panning for gold.”26
This daily process is the job of regional monitors, and is referred to 
internally by Stratfor as “normal sweeping” or “sweeps.” The sweeps are a semi­
formalized process for monitoring an identified list of news sources for regional or 
thematic areas of interest, and communicating highlights internally among 
Stratfor employees. The daily process aims to keep Stratfor employees abreast 
of all significant developments in a particular region or on a particular topic (i.e. 
Energy, Economy, Politics). These sweeps form the foundation for Stratfor 
intelligence analysis in this research project. The dataset demonstrates that 
these sweeps are dispersed throughout the company and are discussed by 
employees at all levels of the organization.
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26 Michael Wilson, “Set - up Docs,” Wikileaks, July 5, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/20/2042034 set-up-docs-.html.
The analytical depth of the sweeps varies, with the levels of intensity 
identified as “sweep tiers.” At times of increased activity or political/client 
interest, the Stratfor sweeps can go into “heightened monitoring mode.”27 Stratfor 
outlines a systematic and daily process of “sweeping” an identified region to 
collect a general picture of all significant developments in all fields: political, 
economic, and security in both domestic and international arenas. Additionally, 
Stratfor sweeping instructions mention that “anomalous events” should be noted 
and documented.
The sweep process is guided by the above procedures and a prescribed 
list of news sources to be monitored. A 2011 email exchange between Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) monitor Izabella Sami and her replacement, in preparation 
for Sami's vacation, described the sweeping process as including Google 
searches and “searches of FSU sites.”28 The specific FSU sites are documented 
on Stratfor's internal wiki called Clearspace, to which this project does not have 
access, although the site listing was occasionally emailed and thus captured for 
study here. Sources for “quick sweep,” “intermediary AOR sweeps,” and “full 
sweeps” are broken out by country, and evolve over time (See Appendix B). The 
selection of these sources is a significant part of the production of the GI Files. 
The rules governing these sweeps, and the decision-makers who shape the 
process of these sweeps also influence the outcomes of Stratfor intelligence.
27 Marko Papic, “Europe Monitoring Sources,” Wikileaks, accessed March 30, 2015, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/17/1724779 europe-monitoring-sources-.html.
28 William Hobart, “Re: Russia Sweeps 11 October to 11 November,” Wikileaks, October 4, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/21/2111542 re-russia-sweeps-11-october-to-11-november-.html.
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Watch officer Michael Wilson sent the 2010 sweep list to monitors Izabella 
Sami and Klara Kiss Kingston.29 On February 3rd, 2010 Wilson wrote to his 
colleagues, “Hi guys, Same deal as last time. Eugene30 put this sweep together. 
Anything you guys can add would be much appreciated.” The significance of this 
email is threefold. At Stratfor:
• analysts (like Eugene) create sweep source lists for their regions;
• monitors (like Izabella and Klara) are regularly asked for input on source 
lists;
• watch officers (like Michael) facilitate communication between analysts 
and monitors.
Subsequent email exchanges detail how the FSU source list must have gone 
through an iterative process involving at least Eugene if not also watch officer 
Michael and research director Kevin. Subsequently, the list would have been 
augmented and edited further by the inclusion of input from Izabella and Klara, as 
evidenced by the February email mentioned above.
Appendix B also shows how the source list changes over time. The far 
right column is the FSU source list distributed to Stratfor employees in 2011.
Even a quick glance shows that the list of sources grew in every instance, with 
the exception of the “General Central Asia/Caucasus” portion of the source list,
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29 Michael Wilson, “FSU Monitoring Sources Sweep Update,” Wikileaks, February 3, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/65/656677 fsu-monitoring-sources-sweep-update-.html.
30 Eugene Chausovsky, then Eurasia Analyst (current Stratfor Director of Europe and Former Soviet Union Analysis)
which in 2011 was broken out into specific countries of interest (Tajikistan & 
Kyrgyzstan).
These email conversations and source lists offer a glimpse at the process 
of creating daily intelligence through a semi-formalized sweeping process that 
relies on news media. Analysts, monitors, watch officers, and the research 
director identify these media sources. The information in these sweeps is 
distributed widely and daily, thus having far-reaching impacts.
This process details how individual monitors, while working within a 
framework of analysis, are self-directed and use their own discretion on a daily 
basis. Monitors are responsible for maintaining and updating the source list, 
identifying pertinent articles, and translating foreign-language articles using their 
own language skills (at times augmented by Google Translate). This creates 
many openings for individual decision-making. While monitors are guided by the 
source list, they ultimately determine which articles to highlight for the team. The 
team, including their superiors, can ask the monitor for more information or direct 
the monitor to pay particular attention to a specific developing event. The watch 
officers in charge of the monitors also may redirect the attention or focus of the 
monitors, according to their own intuition or according to directives from their 
superiors.
That being said, within a formalized process and a defined hierarchy, the 
monitors exercise significant discretion. They work remotely (often across a 
spread of time zones) and correspond with their colleagues and superiors via 
email. With intimate, daily knowledge of their area of responsibility (AOR) news
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sources, monitors make changes to the source list and articles for distribution 
without alerting superiors. This practice is documented in several ways 
throughout the GI Files.
This process for creating sweeps, and the analysis based on this OSINT 
relies heavily on news media reporting, news media published in English, the 
translation skills of monitors, and decision-makers who shape the daily selection 
of disseminated articles, as well as those actors who shape the main source list.
It is important to recognize this last influence on Stratfor products: actors such as 
editors and journalists publishing at news sources on Stratfor monitoring lists. 
Stratfor's internal procedures, as well as the procedures leading to news reports, 
thus shape the discourse of intelligence related to U.S. perceptions of Russia 
and the Arctic.
4.2.2.2 Key Actors 
The table below breaks out the most frequent email sender in Stratfor's 
Global Intelligence (GI) files by year, and the most frequent email recipient. The 
purpose of this inquiry was to identify key actors within the dataset. For each 
year, the key actor was FSU monitor Izabella Sami. Please note that from 2004 - 
2006 there is no communication containing “Russia” and “Arctic” from the Global 
Intelligence Files, a finding that will be explored in a later section of the thesis. 
Table 4 Key Actors in the Global Intelligence Files documents
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Year # Most frequent sender Most frequent recipient
Stratfor
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emails
2004 - 2006 0 out of 793 / /
2007 3 out of 793 n/a analysts@stratfor. com
2008 11 out of 793 izabella.sami@stratfor.com eurasia@stratfor.com,os@stratfor.com,countrybriefs@stratfor.com
2009 177 out of 793 izabella.sami@stratfor.com os@stratfor.com
2010 155 out of 793 izabella.sami@stratfor.com os@stratfor.com
2011 440 out of 793 izabella.sami@stratfor.com os@stratfor.com
yearunknown 7 out of 793 izabella.sami@stratfor.com os@stratfor.com
Information culled from emails in the dataset contributes to the profile of Izabella 
Sami below.
4.2.2.2.1 Profiling Izabella Sami 
Izabella Sami, Stratfor’s Former Soviet Union (FSU) monitor seems to 
have joined Stratfor in May of 2008. This assumption is based on an email 
conversation between Lauren Goodrich, Senior Eurasia Analyst and Director of 
Analysis, and herself about setting up her email account in which Goodrich 
proclaims "You’ve been Stratfor-ized!”31
Sami reveals much about her personal life in her work emails, as many 
people do. In December of 2008 she was married to an American32 working for 
the USAID Economic Growth Office in Kabul, 33 living alone in Skopje,34 and had 
a grown daughter who was attending UC Berkeley and soon to be married.35 In 
2009 Sami mentions that she has a long work history in international 
organizations and embassies, including the OSCE and the Hague Tribunal. She 
also reveals that she is Macedonian, but not an ethnic Albanian.
Often, Sami is reserved and "no-nonsense” in her emails. She is 
deferential to her superiors, and at times, for instance, when asking for time off, 
she comes across as timid. In contrast to some other Stratfor employees (for
31 Lauren Goodrich, "Re: [Fwd: Email Info for Izabella Sami],” Wikileaks, May 1, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/55/5541346 re-fwd-email-info-for-izabella-sami-.html.
32 Izabella Sami, "Re: Hey Izabella II ...,” Wikileaks, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/65/659842 re-hey-izabella-ii-.html
33 Eugene Chausovsky, "Re: [Eurasia] Izabella Moving to Armenis Soon,” Wikileaks, September 7, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/28/2878666 re-eurasia-izabella-moving-to-armenis- soon-.html.
34 Lauren Goodrich, "Re: Happy Holidays,” Wikileaks, December 22, 2008. http://wl.wikileaks- press.org/gifiles/docs/5412158 re-happy-holidays-.html.
35 Ibid.
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example Marko Papic or Mark Lanthemann) she is not frequently chatty or 
informal; however the tone of her emails is courteous and friendly. She seems to 
be well liked by her colleagues.
Emails suggest that she is respected by her superiors for her experience 
in international governmental organizations and in Macedonia, and valued for her 
command of multiple languages (Macedonian, Russian, English, and possibly 
Hungarian36). In one email she is asked about security procedures and the 
history of the OSCE mission in Macedonia, and she replies succinctly and with 
confidence.37 In another email watch officer Chris Farnham writes "Izabella 
advises me that the news source is very reliable,”38 indicating he perceives her 
as an authority. As referenced elsewhere in this research project, her input is 
sought and included in creating the source list for monitoring the FSU region. 
Conversation with Peter Zeihan,39 Stratfor’s former Vice President of Analysis, 
reflects her being respected as an authority despite her lower-level position 
within the organization.
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36 Izabella Sami, "Re: Izabella - Please Read,” Wikileaks, August 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/66/661603 re-izabella-please-read-.html.
37 Marko Papic, "Re: [Eurasia] [CT] Embassy Staffer and His Translator Arrested in Germany,” Wikileaks, March 2009, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/16/1672875 re-eurasia-ct-embassy- staffer-and-his-translator-arrested-in.html.
38 Lauren Goodrich, "Re: G3/B3/GV* - RUSSIA/ITALY/LIBYA/ENERGY - Gazprom Could Comeback to Libya,” Wikileaks, September 14, 2011,https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/18/1830332 re-g3-b3-gv-russia-italy-libya-energy-gazprom- could-comeback.html.
39 Marko Papic, "Re: [Eurasia] GREECE/MACEDONIA - Greece Backs ‘Republic of Northern Macedonia,’” Wikileaks, April 2009, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/16/1675069 re-eurasia- greece-macedonia-greece-backs-republic-of.html.
Her interconnectedness to different aspects of international governance 
and security apparatus demonstrates the fluidity of her knowledge and its 
geographic breadth. During the time span of the dataset she lived in Skopje, 
Budapest, and Yerevan; and with a husband stationed in Afghanistan, a sick 
mother in Budapest and a daughter in California, she maintained close personal 
ties across the globe.
As an internationally experienced, multi-lingual monitor working remotely, 
Sami had the authority to operate with some degree of autonomy. In response to 
one of the few emails from a superior correcting her work performance, she 
writes: "I do need some guidance once in awhile.”40 Her statement indicates that 
she is often left to her own devices in her monitoring and translation of FSU news 
sites on the os@stratfor.com and eurasia@stratfor.com lists. This autonomy and 
respect reflect the trust and authority she enjoys to make analytical decisions. 
That is, she decides how to translate, what to share in her daily sweeps, based 
on her life experience as a career employee in international governmental 
organizations and as a well-travelled European speaking several languages. 
While only a small percent of the entire Global Intelligence files is analyzed in this 
research study, a quick search of Wikileaks’ site reveals that "Izabella Sami” is 
mentioned (likely as sender) in 4,000+ of the 11,000+ emails found in the Global 
Intelligence Files containing the words Arctic and Russia. Her imprint upon this
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40 Izabella Sami, "Re: Izabella - Please Read,” Wikileaks, August 2010, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/66/661603 re-izabella-please-read-.html.
dataset, and the discourse surrounding Arctic and Russia emerging from Stratfor 
is indelible.
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4.2.2.3 Production: Email Communication 
Monitors such as Sami collect news items through this sweeping process 
and distribute them via email to individuals on internal Stratfor email lists. Stratfor 
has specific email lists for various types of information, and for different types of 
employees. Strafor gives email communication much weight; one internal 
document identifies email as "how we communicate as a company.”41 The email 
list selected by the sender is a type of tagging. The sender thereby identifies who 
needs to see this information, as well as its topic. Below is a table of the email 
lists used in this dataset, organized by year and frequency of use.
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41 Nathan Hughes, "Fwd: Email Guidance - Now in Effect,” Wikileaks, April 30, 2009,https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/35/3548126 fwd-email-guidance-now-in-effect-.html.
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Table 5 Email lists by year and frequency of use
Em ail sent to List__ unknow n 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 total
alerts@ stratfor.com 1 1
allstratfor@ stratfor.com 1 2 3
analysts@ stratfor.com 2 4 1 1 1 9
aors@ stratfor.com 1 1
briefers@ stratfor.com 1 1
countrybriefs@ stratfor.com 70 42 112
dia log-list@ stratfor.com 41 41
econ@ stratfor.com 1 1
eurasia@ stratfor.com 2 5 99 45 32 251
gvalerts@ stratfor.com 1 1
m ilitary@ stratfor.com 1 1
os@ stratfor.com 6 1 5 171 143 269 761
researchers@ stratfor.com 1 1
translations@ stratfor.com 1 89 90
watchofficer@ stratfor.com 1 1 1 3
writers@ stratfor.com 1 1
Total 8 3 20 317 192 440 127942
The os@stratfor.com list for open source information is by far the most heavily 
used at 761 emails, and is consistently in use from 2008 to 2011. Email lists 
eurasia@stratfor.com and countrybriefs@stratfor.com for region and country- 
specific updates (respectively) are the next most frequently emailed with a
42 Some emails are sent to more than one email list, hence the inflated total.
cumulative 363 emails. The fourth most popular email listing is 
translations@stratfor.com, a list for translations, as the working language of 
Stratfor is English. These four email lists received the bulk of the dataset’s 
emails, capturing almost 95 percent of email traffic in the Stratfor dataset. The 
email list alerts@stratfor.com received only one email in this dataset that spans 
seven years. The alerts email list is identified in internal Stratfor documents as 
being for "high-level situational awareness,”43 so it can be surmised that this 
dataset does not include high-level intelligence alerts. This analysis of distribution 
patterns signifies that at Stratfor, during the time period of 2004 - 2011, emails 
about Arctic Russia were seen as:
• Pertaining to the Eurasian region (eurasia@stratfor.com),
• Related to certain nation states (countrybriefs@stratfor.com) and not, for 
example thematic issues such as environmental, financial, or indigenous 
issues, etc.
• Open-source material (os@stratfor.com) as opposed to the high level 
intelligence sent to alerts@stratfor.com,
• Often items for translation, presumably from Russian to English 
(translations@stratfor.com). These items appear in the files as already 
completed English translations, and their original language is not a part of 
the dataset.
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43 Nathan Hughes, "Fwd: Email Guidance - Now in Effect,” Wikileaks, April 30, 2009,https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/35/3548126 fwd-email-guidance-now-in-effect-.html.
Emails were dated 2007 at the earliest, with the bulk of emails being sent from 
2008 - 2011. This indicates that Stratfor was not actively collecting intelligence or 
performing sweeps on Arctic Russia from 2004 - 2006, and was not heavily 
invested in monitoring/communicating about Russia’s engagement in the Arctic 
until 2009.
81
4.2.2.4 Production: Creating the Cablegate Collection 
The Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy (PlusD) collection from Wikileaks 
includes over 250,000 predominantly confidential44 cables created and used by 
the State Department. Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State, famously called 
the publication of these documents "‘an attack on the international community, 
sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations,’”45 and her words align 
generally with sentiment from other state officials and major news outlets. The 
168 cables that included the key terms Russia and Arctic used here span from 
2005 to 2010. This sub-section examines these 168 cables for revealing patterns 
emerging from sender and receiver, and for tagging and classification trends.
In the GI Files, Stratfor’s communication revealed much about the internal 
process of creating analysis. The CableGate collection however is comprised of 
predominately completed analytical products. State Department employees send 
polished, vetted, final cables between posts. While these cables contain frank 
analysis that could embarrass the U.S. foreign diplomacy agency, they do not 
reveal as much of the iterative or dialogic creative process of analysis as the GI 
Files. Consequently, the production analysis that follows is slightly different than 
the analysis performed on the GI Files. The collections are sufficiently different to 
require different approaches.
82
44 Not all cables in the PlusD collection were classified, however even unclassified diplomatic exchange is not normally readily available, in a widely publicized searchable free archive.
45 Micah L. Sifry and Andrew Rasiej, WikiLeaks and the Age o f Transparency, (Counterpoint, 2011) 37.
State Department cables have a set of metadata associated with them. 
These include: cable title, sending date, sending post/agency and recipient 
post/agency, original and current classification, tags, and other. An example of 
the full metadata captured for each cable is shown below (Fig. 2), in a screenshot 
of one of the dataset’s cables:
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RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: POLICY AND COMPETING VOICES
Date : 2009 May 2 6 ,1 1:41 (Tuesday)
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 
Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned --
Executive Order: 
TAGS:
— Not Assigned --
ENRG - Economic Affairs--Energy and 
Power I PGOV - Political Affairs- 
Government; Internal Governmental 
Affairs I PREL - Political Affairs-- 
External Political Relations I RS - 
Russia I SENV - Social Affairs- 
Environment 
E n c lo s u re : — Not Assigned -­
O f f ic e  O r ig in :  -  N/A o h  B l a n k  -  
O ff ic e  A c tio n : -  N/A o r  B l a n k -  
From: R u s s ia  Moscow
T o : C e n t r a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y  I D e f e n s e  
I n t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y  I G r o u p  
D e s t i n a t i o n s  E u r o p e a n  P o l i t i c a l  
C o l l e c t i v e  I J o i n t  C h ie f s  o r S t a f f  I 
NATO - E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  C o o p e r a t i v e  I 
N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  I R H M F I S S  
S A C E U R  P O L A D  S H A P E  B E  I 
R U C P D C  N O A A I S e c r e t a r y  o f  D e f e n s e  
I S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e
C an o n ica l ID : 09MOSCOW1346_a
C u rre n t C la s s i f ic a t io n :  CONFIDENTIAL 
C h a ra c te r  Count: 14298
L o c a to r: TEXT ONLINE 
C oncepts: -  Not Assigned --
Type: TE 
Archive Status : -- Not Assigned -­
Markings : — Not Assigned --
Figure 2 Cablegate Cable metadata as published on Wikileaks46
Two areas of the production process that are ripe for a meso-level analysis are 
the Cablegate collection’s "Tag” and "Classification” categories. The following 
analyzes what tags and classifications reveal about content and areas of concern 
in the Cablegate collection. This meso-level analysis aims to reveal patterns and 
trends of State Department discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic.
46 Amb. John Beyrle, "Russia And The Arctic: Policy And Competing Voices.” Wikileaks, May 26, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09M0SC0W1346_a.html.
4.2.2.4.1 Recipients of the Cablegate Collection 
Cables were often sent to multiple agencies, offices, and diplomatic posts. 
The most frequent recipient in this collection of Cablegate was the office of the 
Secretary of State, with 145 of 168 cables received. Following the Secretary of 
State, the most frequent recipient was the office of the Secretary of Defense.
This is expected, as these two recipients are top intelligence consumers. Authors 
Roger George and James Bruce of Analyzing Intelligence write: "the makers of 
foreign and defense policy -- primarily the Secretaries of State and Defense -­
are key intelligence consumers with different intelligence needs reflecting their 
unique operational responsibilities.”47 It is not surprising that these two officials 
would receive the largest volume of these cables, however it is noteworthy, in 
this analysis of threat detection and trends towards securitization, that the 
Secretary of Defense was the second most frequent recipient. The Secretary of 
Defense received just 58 of the cables, far fewer than the Secretary of State.
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47 James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George, Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives. Second Edition. (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 29.
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T o p  20  r«cap«enta of C ab leg a te  cables
Figure 3 Top recipients of Cablegate collection (# of instances by Recipient)
The National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. embassy in 
Moscow comprise the remaining top five recipients of this collection. This 
indicates identification of security or defense matters of interest in this data. 
However, even combined, these four recipients did not surpass the Secretary of 
State as recipients of the cables in this dataset. Other defense or security 
branches of the U.S. government that received this collection of cables include: 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and the U.S. European Command (US EUCOM). 
One possible explanation for the predominance of the CIA and the DIA as top ten 
recipients in this dataset is the post-9/11 trend towards interagency intelligence 
sharing. Authors of Analyzing Intelligence note that since the 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) communication amongst the IC 
"has inevitably yielded greater transparency and collaboration, as well as an 
enhanced effort to define collaborative boundaries between DIA and CIA, the 
principle all-source analytic organizations with expertise in military analysis...”48 
In an era of interagency sharing these two agencies are tasked with ingesting all 
sources of intelligence. Nevertheless, they did not receive all of these cables.
Another interesting trend to note is that U.S. Army’s Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), which has the mandate to operate out of the U.S. Arctic region, 
received this intelligence material only four times. U.S. Army’s Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM), which shares the U.S. Arctic domestic mandate 
with USPACOM, received the intelligence in only three instances. U.S. Army’s 
European Command (USEUCOM) is listed as a recipient in seven instances. To 
provide some context for these figures, diplomatic posts in Afghanistan received 
twenty-one cables, posts in China and Hong Kong received seventeen cables, 
and collectively the Polynesian island nations of Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea 
and Palau received seven. In this data set the State Department is not 
communicating with Arctic-mandated army commands with any frequency on 
issues using the words "Russia” and the "Arctic.”
In summary, the collection tends toward communication with political and 
embassy entities, and secondarily with security and defense entities. Domestic 
security and intelligence arms are widely represented as recipients of this
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intelligence, but also of note is the frequency of communication with international 
security/defense offices at NATO and the UN.
The prevalence of European embassy posts and European-focused 
international groups as recipients highlights a European emphasis in the dataset. 
This is noteworthy as the U.S., Canada, and Russia, none of which are 
classically categorized as "European” control the largest geographic portions of 
the Arctic region, and commands the wealth of combined operational capabilities 
in the Arctic. Thus the tendency to favor European recipients is an unexpected 
pattern that may indicate sentiment that the Arctic is a European, as opposed to 
a North American, or a Eurasian concern. Sixty-eight of the 151 cables contain 
the word "Europe” and a scan of these documents reveals they touch on a 
variety of topics.
A confidential cable from then U.S. Ambassador to Russia John R. Beyrle
titled "DFM Grushko On Georgia, Energy Security, And European Security”
mentions the Arctic only once. The document references failures of European
security measures to include Russian participation. Writes Beyrle:
As a result of the failures of the CFE, OSCE, as well as gaps in European security, including energy security, Grushko advocated for Medvedev's proposed EST (reftel), arguing that energy security, the Arctic, cyber­security, territorial integrity, the use of force, and instruments of arms control needed to be discussed in a more open and inclusive mechanism.49
Europe, security issues, and the Arctic are three areas in which the U.S. State 
Department seeks increased collaboration with Russia.
49 Amb. John Beyrle, "DFM Grushko On Georgia, Energy Security, And European Security.” Wikileaks, February 13, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MOSCOW355_a.html.
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Also surprising is the frequency with which Middle Eastern and Asian 
embassy posts were recipients of this intelligence. The documents reveal that the 
United States views Russia not only as a potential partner in the Arctic, but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. This 
perception is documented in a 2009 secret cable written by then Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton titled "Ambassador Volker's meeting with Russian 
Ambassador.”50 In the effort to engage Russia as an ally and partner of the 
United States, Clinton writes that "Amb. Volker's meeting gives us an opportunity 
to reiterate that the Obama Administration is interested in strengthening 
cooperation with Russia, in particular in areas of joint concern, e.g., Afghanistan, 
counterterrorism, counter proliferation.”51 The document references plans to re­
activate a NATO-Russia dialogue and to expand conversations with regard to the 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC), as well as briefly mentioning the Arctic. The 
aspirations captured in this document are collaborative and extend to the Arctic:
Secretary Clinton recently pledged that the Administration will prove "very receptive" to dialogue on the High North; Arctic issues, which ‘dramatically affect’ our own interests, also offer the opportunity for ‘positive action’ and to ‘deepen our partnerships.’52
The operative word to describe the quotation above is "opportunity,” indicating 
that the Arctic is seen as a safe area for effective U.S. collaboration with the 
Russian state. Note here that this is one of sixteen secret cables. Even while
50 Sec. of State Hillary Clinton, "Amb Volker’s Meeting With Russian Ambassador,” Wikileaks, January 30, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE8311 a.html.
51 Ibid.
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52 Ibid.
discussing sensitive issues such as counter proliferation and America’s ongoing 
conflicts in the Middle East, the cable maintains a mostly positive tone.
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4.2.2.4.2 Tagging in the Cablegate Collection 
The tags attached to these same cables allow for a better understanding 
of the subject matter. The graph below (Fig. 4) groups all the tags applied by 
State Department officials by category: Political Affair, Military Affair, 
Environmental Affair, Regional Affair, etc. These tagging categories are taken 
directly from the State Department with the exception of the categories "State,” 
"IGO,” "Region,” and "Flu Activities.” The tag category "State” groups all 
specifically mentioned nation states, the "IGO” category groups international 
governing bodies such as UN and NATO, the "Region” category groups all tags 
pertaining to a regional area (with the exception of the Arctic Region which is 
kept separately), and the "Flu Activities” category groups all tags pertaining to flu 
epidemics.
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Tags in C ab lega te  C o lle c tio n
300
Figure 4 Tags in the Cablegate Collection
The largest tag category is "Political Affairs,” followed by "State,” a tag I 
created for all specifically mentioned nation states. The State Department tag for 
"Economic Affairs” is the third largest category, followed by much fewer instances 
of State Department tags for the "Environment” and "Military Affairs.” As with the 
recipient analysis above, political affairs are the most commonly used tag 
category. While military matters take a spot in the top five most common tags
and recipients and, while security and defense concerns are represented 
whether sorting by recipient (discussed previously) or by tag, these categories 
appear far less frequently than diplomatic and foreign policy recipients and tags. 
This pattern reveals a tendency of State Department staff to categorize the 
documents in this discourse as political over military concerns, which indicates 
that State Department sources captured here do not securitize Russian 
engagement in the Arctic. A securitized discourse would more heavily 
incorporate defense and intelligence actors, and in so doing would lend itself 
more to tagging that identifies the discourse as a military affair. This tagging 
practice would be a by-product of the way that securitized discourses are a break 
from politics as usual, and engage military and defense actors more fully in 
resolving or addressing the ensuing securitized discourse.
4.2.2.4.3 Classification in the Cablegate Collection 
Another significant data point from the Cablegate Collection is the 
Classification tag. Executive Order 13526 on "Classified National Security 
Information” prescribes a systematic process across all federal agencies for 
classifying information. National defense historically "has required that certain 
information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our 
democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign 
nations.”53 The State Department collection of cables contains all levels of
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53 “Executive Order 13526 - Classified National Security Information,” Whitehouse.gov, December29, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national- security-information.
classification with the exception of the "top secret” classification. They include 
documents with unclassified, confidential, and secret classifications, and the 
modifier of "No Forn.” "Unclassified” is not technically a classification, and 
unclassified documents can legally be released to anybody regardless of their 
security clearance. As outlined in the 2005 Department of State Classification 
guide, the confidential classification applies to information that "reasonably could 
be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original 
classification authority is able to identify or describe.” 54 In the case of this 
dataset, the State Department is the original classification authority, as it created 
and first distributed these cables. Secret classification is applied to information 
that "reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
55security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.”55 
The qualifier "No Forn” is given to information that is not for release to foreign 
nationals, or is "information that should not be disseminated to locally engaged 
staff.”56 Top Secret materials were not distributed on SIPRNET, and thus are not 
a part of the Cablegate Collection.
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54 "Department Of State Classification Guide (DSCG 05-01),” Department of State, January 2005, https://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dos-class.pdf.
55 Ibid.
56 "Guidance For Drafting SBU Telegram,” Department of State, October 1, 1995, http://fas.org/sgp/news/2000/02/sbu.html. (emphasis added)
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Figure 5 Classifications in the Cablegate Collection
The pie chart above (Fig. 5) breaks out the classification types applied to 
this dataset’s cables. About half of the collection is classified "Confidential,” with 
a small portion of that being "Confidential - No Forn.” Almost 40 percent of the 
dataset is "Unclassified” or "Unclassified for official use only.” Just 10 percent of 
the dataset is classified "Secret.”
As the documents analyzed here contain 100 percent of the cables 
mentioning both the Arctic and Russia in the entire 250,000 Cablegate collection, 
these patterns of classification indicate that the conversations about the Arctic 
and Arctic Russia during this time were relatively few and a small percentage 
contained information that was seen to pose a major risk to national security.
When analyzing classification patterns, it should be noted that some 
former State Department employees have critiqued the formulaic nature57 of 
categorization at the State Department. State Department officials reportedly use 
templates for cables with pre-designated classifications. This could lead to over­
classification or incorrect application of classification according to the guidelines 
cited above.
Secondly, some argue that the risk-averse federal government over­
classifies items to the point of diluting the significance of classification. Fears 
about accidentally releasing sensitive information may result in material receiving 
a higher classification than necessary. That being said, Executive Order 13526 
specifically outlines that "if there is significant doubt about the appropriate level of 
classification, it shall be classified at the lower level.”58 The classification patterns 
noted here may be the result of a formulaic approach to classification, a risk- 
averse approach to classification, or a "rounded-down” approach to classification. 
This is a level of analysis that is not within the scope of this project, but is worth 
noting. As this data-set is viewed as a discourse whose power exists in the eyes 
of its intended recipients, namely government employees with appropriate 
security clearances, then this discourse should be evaluated as it will be read by 
its intended recipients. When viewed as a whole these cables display a low level
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57 Interesting reading from The Nation on the arbitrary and formulaic nature of classification practices at the State Department.
58 "Executive Order 13526 - Classified National Security Information,” Whitehouse.gov, December 29, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information.
of threat to national security detected by its creators, and these perceptions 
would be received and duly noted by their designated recipients.
However, seventeen cables in this dataset are classified as secret. These 
cables primarily address higher-level meetings involving ambassador visits with 
Russian or Norwegian officials and preparations for NATO meetings and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) meetings. In most of these documents the Arctic 
is treated as an arena for potential cooperation, or potential conflict, with Russia. 
These secret cables document pragmatic and diplomatic approaches between 
Western powers and Russia to cooperate on oil spill response, on Arctic marine 
environmental protection, and through international treaties and the Arctic 
Council. Areas of conflict include Russia’s increased military activity in the Arctic, 
Russia’s improper adherence to the START Treaty in providing notice of 
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tests, internal NATO debate 
between different countries about the realities of a "Russian intelligence threat to 
NATO interests including energy security, in the Arctic,” Russian misinformation 
practices designed to assert its Arctic sovereignty claims,59 fears Russia "will set 
the Arctic agenda,”60 and discord surrounding the role of NATO in the Arctic.
One secret cable titled "EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And 
Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials” captures NATO's Minister of Defense 
Deputy Director of Security Policy Jan Olsen’s comments on the role of Russia in
59Amb. Benson Whitney, "Norway: Russian Presence In Svalbard Waters,” Wikileaks, July 16 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OSLO398 a.html.
60 CDA James T. Heg, "Norway’s 2010 Defense Budget: High North And International Engagements,” Wikileaks, October, 15 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09OSLO635 a.html.
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the Arctic. U.S. Ambassador to Norway Barry White sent this cable to recipients 
including the DIA, Joint Analysis Center Molesworth (UK-based military 
intelligence analysis center for USEUCOM), NATO - European Union 
Cooperative, Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. The 2010 cable 
reports,
On Russia Olsen described a growing "convergence of Russian rhetoric and military capability" which had the potential for creating a "more interesting" situation with Russia as it pursues its ambitions in the Arctic High North. MFA Russia Expert Anne Kjersti Karlsen contrasted Russia's continuing flights along Norway's coastline and portrayal of NATO as Russia's worst enemy with her judgment that Russia's true security focus was on China. Klovstad cautioned against extensive NATO involvement in Arctic issues saying the GoN wanted to avoid an escalation of tensions but noted Norway's desire for NATO to monitor the situation.61
The cable goes on to explore the future possible response within NATO and
other Arctic states (Iceland, Sweden, and Finland), saying:
Klovstad said that the GoN would like NATO to follow and be aware of developments in the Arctic High North in a way that would avoid provoking the Russians into tit-for-tat responses and escalation. For example,NATO could play a role in exercises for search and rescue capabilities, including through the NATO-Russia Council. She brought up the "Stoltenberg process," which calls for enhanced security cooperation with Iceland, Sweden and Finland while respecting each country's differing relationship with NATO.
Ambassador Klovstad is seen here to be signaling alarm on behalf of the 
government of Norway, while also suggesting a diplomatic approach. The U.S. 
Ambassador White forwards this communication on to other U.S. government 
officials without voicing U.S.-based alarm or offering a U.S. approach.
61 ‘‘EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials.” Wikileaks, January 26 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OSLO45 a.html.
A cable addressing the 2006 closure of the U.S. naval base in Keflavik, 
Iceland titled "Icelandic Defense Policy one Year after United States Withdrawal,” 
notes that Russia’s interest in the Arctic regions relates to greater accessibility 
due to climate change. This cable sent from then U.S. Ambassador to Iceland 
Carol van Voorst advises the United States to urge Icelandic powers to expand 
security in advance of these future developments, including partnership with 
NATO. Ambassador van Voorst’s cable closes by stating "We also want to quietly 
but strongly support efforts to improve the quality of the national discussion on 
defense and security affairs ... These steps will help ensure that we and the 
Icelanders will be in sync as the security environment in the High North 
evolves.”62 Conversations about future Arctic security concerns cast Russia as a 
potential threat; however, the role of the U.S. remains to advise and encourage 
European partners to address Russian engagement in the Arctic and, as a last 
resort, to expand collaboration with NATO.
The secret cables examined here, while relaying information that may 
summarize conversations that took place between very exclusive groups, do not 
reveal any information that is not also available in news media or other open 
source channels. More so, these secret documents correlate the discourse that is 
taking place within the larger data set. Most of the discourse about the Arctic and 
Russia occurring during this timeframe at the State Department was not secret, 
nor was it even classified material. It is possible that Top Secret communications
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62 Amb. Carol van Voorst, “Icelandic Defense Policy One Year After U.S. Withdrawal,” Wikileaks, November 9 2007, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07REYKJAVIK322 a.html.
not available for this research project dominated the conversation within the 
State Department about the Arctic and Russia, but U.S. public policy does not 
suggest a separate substantially different top secret discourse based on 
perceptions of a serious threat posed by Russian engagement in the Arctic.
In summary, the Cablegate collection tags do not indicate that the State 
Department or Stratfor have securitized the discourse about Russian 
engagement in the Arctic. These documents are more likely to be tagged by the 
creators as political and state affairs than military, defense, or security affairs. 
These documents are predominantly unclassified and confidential documents 
that State Department officials tag in terms that suggest non-securitization. While 
security and defense concerns arise in the conversation about Russia and the 
Arctic, these concerns are less prevalent than other concerns. If viewed as one 
large discussion, the nature of the conversation has a wider, geopolitical focus 
rather than an Arctic-specific focus. The XC (Arctic Ocean Region) tag appears 
only three times in this dataset. Detailed examination of seventeen secret 
documents confirms the complicated role of NATO in Arctic affairs, documents 
regional concerns of Russia’s behavior in the Arctic, and witnesses U.S. 
positioning to support European forces to address potential conflict with Russia in 
the arena of the Arctic.
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4.2.2.5 Production: Summary 
The meso-level of analysis revealed much about Stratfor and the State 
Department’s assessments of Russian engagement in the Arctic. Most notably, 
OSINT sweeps and unclassified or low-level classified content dominates this 
dataset. This pattern across both data sources supports my hypothesis of a non­
securitized discourse on Russian engagement in the Arctic.
The meso-level of analysis uncovered two key sets of actors influencing 
the intelligence process that produced the Global Intelligence Files. These 
influencers include monitors (lower-tiered Stratfor employees) with substantial 
autonomy to filter and select the types of information received by private 
intelligence analysts on a daily basis. Another influencing group that lies beyond 
the scope of this project is the news media. Reporters and editors at news 
agencies who provide the fodder for these daily sweeps inform analytical 
products consumed internally at Stratfor, and externally by Stratfor clients 
including U.S. government employees and officials. Editorial selections of 
newsworthy items and their interpretation of events significantly impact the 
discourse generated by OSINT processes. The role of news media in the Stratfor 
OSINT process will be revisited in content analysis performed within the micro­
level analysis.
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4.2.3 Summary of the Meso-Level of Analysis
In March 2015, the Director of the Pentagon’s National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency (NGA) Robert Cardillo corroborated the patterns detected in
this meso-level of analysis. Cardillo told DefenseOne, an online news source
focused on U.S. defense and security, "a great deal of what’s known about the
Arctic is unclassified. We don’t have a rich history of classified intelligence
collection in the Arctic, because — guess what? — it wasn’t a priority.”63 This
statement affirms this thesis’ meso-level analysis as well as its central finding.
The Arctic has not been high on the list of military, political, or intelligence
priorities for some time. The perceived lack of Russian capacity in the Arctic has
partially informed this position. If the U.S. felt real risk to its national security
interests emanating from Russia’s engagement in the Arctic, in the way that for
example, Finland has, it may have responded quite differently. Securitization of
Russian behavior in the Arctic would have resulted in different U.S. Arctic
strategy and policy efforts.
The assessment of Russia’s incapacity relied on perceived military,
economic and political insufficiencies of the Russian Federation. U.S. actors
have viewed Russian military and naval capacity as aging and underfunded
when compared with United States and allied resources. The Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) Senior VP for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic
Heather Conley expressed this perception recently in an interview with the
63 Aliya Sternstein, "The Pentagon’s Satellite Spies Are Aiming for the Arctic,” Defense One, March 9, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/03/pentagons-satellite-spies-are-
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aiming-arctic/107076/.
Washington Post: "For many years, we kind of discounted Russia’s conventional 
military.”64 Her comments, captured in April 2015, highlight a shift in perception of 
Russia in the Arctic. U.S. actors have also questioned the Russian Federation’s 
political capacity. In a widely circulated internal email, Stratfor’s then Vice 
President of Analysis Peter Zeihan presented a profile of a politically weak 
Russian president Vladimir Putin. This email is available on Wikileaks; however, 
it is not technically a part of this dataset as it does not directly reference the 
Arctic. The 2007 email discusses human-sourced intelligence (HUMINT). Stratfor 
CEO George Friedman wrote: "The important intel here is that putin (sic) is 
weaker than he looks.”65 Zeihan responded to the email chain, "Putin is the 
arbiter -- but we've ALWAYS (sic) said that he does not have the power to dictate 
events.” The email reveals that Stratfor sees Russian energy behemoths 
Gazprom and Rosneft as significantly more powerful and potentially threatening 
than President Putin, and this sentiment is corroborated by the email’s original 
human source. Political might in the Russian Federation during this time was 
seen to rest in the hands of the oligarchs - leaders of oil and gas extraction and 
other industries. These assessments corroborate the patterns and trends 
detected in this research project’s meso-level of analysis and provide insight into 
the reason for this discursive stance.
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64 Michael E. Miller, "Arctic ‘chill’ as Russia Reverts to Cold War Air and Sea Confrontations,” The Washington Post, April 17, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning- mix/wp/2015/04/17/arctic-chill-as-russia-reverts-to-cold-war-air-and-sea-confrontations/.
65 Peter Zeihan, "RE: HUMINT - RUSSIA - WHOAA... BP’s Browne/the Inner Circle/the Monopolies,” Wikileaks, May 02 2007, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/54/5481227 re-humint- russia-whoaa-bp-s-browne-the-inner-circle-the.html.
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4.3 Micro-Level Analysis 
While the meso-level of analysis aimed to glean insight from this discourse 
on Russia and the Arctic from patterns and trends in production and distribution 
of the dataset, the micro-level of analysis is interested in patterns in the content. 
This micro-analysis delves into the actual text of the dataset. Content of interest 
includes location entities, keyword entities, general concepts, and document 
sentiment. Sentiment analysis will reveal patterns in opinion and emotional 
leaning in the intelligence discourse on Russian engagement in the Arctic.
In the micro-level of analysis the entire text of all emails (the "body”) and 
cables is analyzed in one group. Sender information, recipient information, and 
titles of emails and cables that were examined in the meso-level of analysis are 
ignored in this phase of analysis. First a sentiment analysis tool called Aylien 
analyzes the body text using natural language processing (NLP) to determine 
document-level sentiment: positive, negative, and neutral. I analyze the 
breakdown of sentiment in the entire dataset and note differences in sentiment 
patterns between the two data sources: the GI Files and Cablegate Collection. 
The programs compare content trends in the positive sentiment class with 
content patterns in the negative sentiment class. While more nuanced sentiment 
analysis may be required to extract deeper meaning, this process did not indicate 
a securitized stance in the data.
Next, I incorporate data analysis of all text in the dataset. This step in the 
micro-level of analysis examines content using data analysis and visualization 
tools that detect relationships between words. These software programs
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incorporate mathematical and numerical processes such as betweenness 
centrality and term frequency to inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) that 
determine relationships and relevance in texts. I examined all Secret cables from 
the Cablegate collection, as this sub-section has a high likelihood of containing 
securitized dialogue. Then, the program analyzed all items in the dataset for 
patterns in word relationships. Lastly, using an extraction tool and mapping 
software I integrated all mentions of geographic location in a map for geographic 
content analysis. The resultant map reveals the international scope of the 
dataset, with location entities falling most densely in Western Europe.
Ultimately, the micro-level of analysis reveals a tendency of this dataset 
towards discussions of international cooperation on political and economic issues 
in the Arctic. Non-U.S. parties cite Russian engagement in the Arctic as troubling 
several times. However, U.S. government actors make little or no direct comment 
on the issue. The U.S. position seems to break into two main categories. The 
U.S. response to European fears of Russian engagement in the Arctic often 
comes across as a diplomatic "not our problem”; for example, in response to 
concerns of the members of the Icelandic government regarding the 2006 closing 
of the U.S. Keflavik Naval Air station. Alternatively, the United States views the 
Arctic as an area ripe for cooperation with Russian powers. Instances from the 
text reveal that diplomatic attempts to engage Russia often show U.S. actors 
using the relative low-stakes Arctic region as a region for engaging Russia in a 
positive way.
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Content reveals patterns of interest in Russian federal-level politics, 
European politics, the role of Arctic Council states, hydrocarbon development, 
and legal issues. Analysis of location entities demonstrates not only an 
interconnected approach to Arctic, but also an absence of specific "Arcticness.” 
Texts reveal a preference for internationalism in the Arctic, with frequent 
references to Western European and Afghani locations. Lending support to 
trends detected elsewhere, this analysis reveals repeated instances of 
intelligence viewing and discussing the Arctic in the language of international 
governance, with Arctic Council member and observer states frequently 
mentioned, and geopolitics (with frequent mentions of Afghanistan as a high 
point of U.S.-Russian relations). Other geographic entities are energy-producing 
nation states and energy transit states (nations with pipelines), leading me to 
conclude that the intelligence interest in the Arctic revolves around hydrocarbon 
extraction.
No detected patterns or trends counter this project’s research 
hypothesis that U.S. intelligence has not securitized Russian engagement 
in the Arctic. Mentions of security and defense issues comprise a 
significant portion of this dataset, and there are many mentions of military 
and naval capacity, security groups such as NATO, and discussions of 
nuclear capacity and submarine fleets. Legal and criminal matters also 
arise in this dataset, in particular issues such as organized crime, maritime 
piracy and trafficking in persons. Yet several analysis tools reveal a 
greater trend in this discourse towards economic and political issues.
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4.3.1 Sentiment Analysis 
To begin the multi-step micro-analysis I ran the text through a 
sentiment analysis tool. Sentiment analysis (SA) uses text-mining 
procedures based on natural language processing (NLP) and 
computational linguistics. Developed for applications in fields such as 
marketing, consumer outreach and reputation management, SA aims to 
pinpoint the attitude of the document’s author or speaker. Sentiment 
analysis contributes to this project by limiting researcher bias as it 
systematically detects sentiment. This objectivity and consistency provided 
greater value in the research process than the comparatively superior 
nuanced emotive skill of a human analyst. In short, this research favors the 
consistency and speed of the sentiment analysis over the more nuanced 
sentiment analysis possible with a human analyst. While SA tools are 
emerging that can detect specific emotional categories (happy, sad, angry, 
etc) such a tool was not utilized here because the focus was on getting a 
general level of sentiment. Additionally, these more nuanced emotive tools 
are still in very developmental phases and not readily accessible to 
masters-level researchers. Sentiment analysis at the document level is 
useful because it allows the researcher to contextualize sentiment trends 
within a large collection of documents.
Given what is known about the institutions that created the two data 
sources, they may systematically demonstrate different types of sentiment. For 
example, the documents in the Cablegate collection are official U.S. State
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Department cables and therefore may be written in a "diplomatic” tone that is 
systematically neutral or positive in sentiment. Alternately, these internal 
documents between State Department colleagues may tend to be more negative 
in sentiment, as their frank expressions about real-world concerns may be more 
spontaneous than communications produced for public consumption. GI Files 
emails from the private intelligence firm Stratfor may include more emotive 
language (leaning either positive or negative) as the private intelligence firm may 
not pressure employees to use formal or official language in email communiques. 
However, the GI Files are known from the meso-level of analysis to be mostly 
open source intelligence. OSINT consists of collections of news articles, often 
from a variety of sources. Detected sentiment may stem from the news article’s 
author, or may come across as neutral, because of the variety of sources in one 
email.
This sentiment analysis will reveal the tone of the discourse. It is highly 
implausible that a securitized discourse would use language that was 
consistently positive in sentiment. Yet given the way that human beings use 
language to communicate sentiments, patterns of negative and positive 
sentiment likely arise in both securitized and non-securitized discourse. What 
follows are the findings of sentiment analysis of the dataset.
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Figure 6 Sentiment of Entire Dataset
The sentiment analysis tool Aylien found that 232 documents exhibit 
positive sentiment and 187 documents exhibit negative sentiment. According to 
this SA tool, 243 documents are neutral in sentiment. This does not mean that 
there are no instances of mixed sentiment exhibited in portions of these 
documents; however, this SA tool examines sentiment polarity at the document 
level and categorizes the document according to the predominant sentiment. As 
a preliminary observation the dataset as a whole is not overwhelmingly negative, 
and is almost equally likely to be positive or neutral in sentiment.
The next step was to look for any noticeable difference in sentiment trends 
between the dataset’s two sources: Stratfor’s internal emails and the U.S. State 
Department’s cables. This step will illuminate sources of difference or similarity, 
and help to attribute trends. For example, if all the negative sentiment documents
are found to originate from one source that should be accounted for in the final 
analysis.
When sentiment class is broken out across the two data sources, the U.S. 
State Department’s Cablegate Collection is more emotive overall. The Cablegate 
Collection has higher percentages of negative and positive sentiment. The GI 
Files from Stratfor have a significantly higher percentage (almost 40 percent) of 
neutral sentiment evincing documents.
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Cablegate Collection Sentiment
Figure 7 Sentiment across data sources
Figure 8 Sentiment across data sources
One would hypothesize that a securitized issue would use language that 
reflects negative sentiment. The documents would communicate these 
sentiments through words like threat, risk, worry, and fear. The sentiment of this 
dataset does not appear, based on these software programs’ findings, to be 
overwhelmingly negative. The dataset is almost split in thirds, with slightly more 
neutral than positive sentiment documents, and slightly more positive than 
negative sentiment documents.
Neutral-sentiment evincing documents appear for a variety of different 
reasons. In general, it appears that neutral sentiment documents are either 
comprised of several articles from multiple news sources or are written in a "fact- 
based” reporting style. Many of the neutral sentiment documents retell details of 
financial and business events, which are predominantly "fact-based reports” 
including details on sale or share prices and lists of business names. This fact- 
based tone appears in documents about non-business topics as well, and this 
writing style is often intentionally neutral in tone. Another subset of the neutral 
sentiment documents contains a collection of news articles on the day’s events in 
Russia. The news articles’ differing editorial stances could prompt the program to 
assign the document a statistically-neutral sentiment polarity number, despite the 
document actually containing positive and negative sentiment portions. Content 
analysis on the sentiment breakdowns of these documents did not reveal 
substantive differences in content between the positively sentimented documents 
and the negatively sentimented documents. Content analysis did, however, 
indicate that the Russian state-owned media inject news articles with both
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positive and negative sentiment. This phenomenon deserves further, dedicated 
research that is beyond the scope of this project.
Taking into consideration the neutral sentiment tone that comes from the 
multi-voiced nature of these documents and the relatively equal division of 
positive, negative and neutral sentiment-documents, the sentiment analysis is 
inconclusive. The analysis tool would require more specificity to make a clear 
statement about the role of sentiment in U.S. intelligence about the Russian 
Arctic. In regards to this project’s prediction of a non-securitized stance, the 
sentiment analysis did not counter this claim; however, with 29 percent of the 
documents detected as being negative in sentiment, it is unclear what 
conclusions can be safely deduced. More investigation into the role of sentiment 
in this the dataset in general is required.
4.3.2 Content Analysis 
In the next step of the micro-analysis, I employed content analysis 
software to examine documents for patterns in content. This step in the micro­
analysis process aims to detect large-scale word patterns. To do so, I used two 
data analysis and visualization programs to visualize networks of words, 
frequency of use, and other types of word and document relationships in the 
content of these two data sources.
Overview is a content analysis program created by the Knight Foundation 
to assist journalists with analyzing large text-based datasets like this one.
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Overview uses text-mining and NLP to analyze documents for word frequency 
and document uniqueness with an algorithm called TF-IDF (text frequency, 
inverse document frequency). Overview groups and orders documents by 
similarity. It arranges these document groups in a tree form (like a file tree or 
family tree), with the largest grouping including all documents. In addition to 
clustering the documents together, Overview also identifies the most common 
and most significant words in each document group. The document tree is 
organized in increasingly smaller word groups. I also determined some key 
words of specific pertinence to this dataset.
66I directed Overview to weigh 400+ words66 more heavily in its algorithmic 
processing. These words pertain to the research project and are positive or 
negative sentiment words (i.e. protested, concern, risk, threat for negative 
sentiment terms and confidence, support, and collaborate for positive sentiment 
terms), names of Arctic nations or actors (i.e. indigenous, Danish, Sweden), 
words common to Arctic political issues (i.e. ice, limit, shelf, agreement, climate 
change) and security / defense words (i.e. nuclear, danger, spill, criminal, victim, 
aggression). The most common words for each group are identified in the 
heading of the group. Below is the document tree Overview created of the 
dataset. The document tree identifies important words and then groups the 
documents by content similarity.
116
66 See Appendix A
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Figure 9 Screen shot of content analysis in the Overview document tree 
Overview detected the following thematic patterns in the dataset:
1. Russian energy companies (keywords: oil and gas, pipeline, Gazprom, 
Rosneft)
2. Russian political actors and groups (keywords: Putin, Medvedev)
3. International energy resource companies operating in the Russian Arctic 
(keywords: BP, ExxonMobil)
4. Russian offshore oil and gas sites (keywords: Prirazlomnoye, Pechora, 
shelf, offshore)
5. Crime and emergencies
6. Transportation of energy resources (keywords: NSR, Novatek, Kola 
Peninsula, transport)
7. Political bodies, such as the Arctic Council, Arctic states, Norwegian and 
Swedish political and security actors (keywords: Greenland, Denmark, and 
Norway)
8. Law, legal conflicts, and infringements (keywords: accident, victim, law, 
resource, shelf)
9. Military and navy capabilities of Russia, Canada and Norway
10. Shipping, research, and nuclear waste
These indicators of significant and key content (please note that "significance” is 
mathematically different than "frequency”) demonstrate that this dataset, this 
discourse, is mainly about the topics listed above. This dataset documents 
interest within the U.S. intelligence community in topics such as the Russian 
energy industry, Arctic shipping, Arctic states, legal issues and criminal concerns, 
naval capacity, and research. The largest content group is a set of documents 
that refer to key Russian political figures of the time Vladimir Putin and Dimitry
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Medvedev, oil and gas related items, and major Arctic legal issues such as 
continental shelf limitations.
Interestingly, the key terms identified fail to reflect the role of Russian 
domestic political powers such as regional and city powers in Arctic energy 
politics. Key Russian political figures identified include President / Prime Minister 
Dimitry Medvedev, President / Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Ambassador to the 
United States Dimitry Rogozin, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, and 
Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. This recurrent mention of 
national, rather than regional political actors may stem from a lack of policy 
power vested in sub-national actors, or from a lack of interest or capacity in the 
U.S. intelligence collection processes. It is beyond the scope of this project to 
examine this absence of reference to local and regional actors further.
4.3.2.1 Content Analysis of the Role of the Arctic Council 
Overview highlights the key role that the Arctic Council plays in this 
discourse. Forty documents in the dataset specifically mention the Arctic Council. 
Delving into the text itself sheds light on this content trend. Words of Danish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Political Director Ulrik V. Knudsen capture two 
opinions on the topic. One State Department cable states that [emphasis added]: 
"Knudsen agreed that the Arctic should not become militarized and took on board 
the United States desire to keep the Arctic Council at the center of discussions
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about the region.”67 This statement clearly documents the United States "desire” 
for a de-militarized Arctic and strong Arctic Council.
This dataset captures the debate that took place during the timespan of 
these documents (2004 - 2011), regarding the exact role of the Arctic 
Council. Line-by-line readings of the text demonstrate that speakers captured in
these documents are engaged in active debate about issues such as:
68• The extent and nature of the Arctic Council’s role68 in the geopolitics of the 
Arctic,
• Which entities and states should be allowed to participate in the Arctic 
Council including debate over the significance of the Arctic 569 (littoral 
states) and concern over non-Arctic states gaining control in the region.
• NATO’s potential role in the Arctic Council70
• The EU’s potential role in the Arctic Council
The debate centers around the extent to which the Arctic Council, NATO, and the 
EU have political and security mandates in the Arctic. The dataset documents 
concern from European parties about a lagging U.S. mandate in the Arctic, 
however, there is little commentary on this matter originating from within the 
United States. Most documents show U.S. actors reporting about the U.S. federal
67 Amb. Laurie S. Fulton, "EUR DAS Quanrud’s February 10-11 Visit: Foreign Affairs, Defense And Social Policy Issues,” Wikileaks, February 22, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10C0PENHAGEN103 a.html.
68 Amb. James P. Cain, "Deputy Secretary’s Meeting With Norwegian FM Stoere In Greenland,” Wikileaks, June 6 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08C0PENHAGEN323 a.html.
69 Ibid.
70 Lauren Goodrich, "Arctic AOR - Russia’s Arctic ‘Sea Grab,’” Wikileaks, August 15, 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/54/5424004 arctic-aor-russia-s-arctic-sea-grab-.html.
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government’s mandate to maintain good relations and coordinate activities with 
Russian actors and engage them politically. This stance corresponds with the 
Arctic Council’s mandate, which clearly and pointedly avoids security discussion. 
That being said, the dataset documents interest on the part of non-U.S, actors in 
identifying an appropriate intergovernmental forum for addressing security 
concerns in the Arctic.71 The U.S. stance also seems to suggest, at least in this 
dataset and in this time period, an expectation that smaller Arctic states take 
responsibility for the security of their own Arctic regions.
In summary, the dataset contains forty documents that mention the Arctic 
Council. This number of references shows strong interest in the Arctic Council. 
One note (referenced above) explicitly cites the U.S. preference that international 
relations be conducted through the intergovernmental forum. There is no clear 
evidence within these references to the Arctic Council that U.S. actors are overly 
concerned with threats to national security originating within the Arctic region, or 
in relation to Arctic issues. In regard to Arctic Council references, no evidence 
suggests that U.S. intelligence has securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic. 
In fact, as the Arctic Council has no security mandate, by preferring the Arctic 
Council as the forum for international relations in the Arctic, the United States 
ostensibly asserts a de-securitized diplomatic arena in the Arctic.
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71 Amb. Kurt Volker, "Rogozin Rambles Soviet-Style In Restart Of The NATO-Russia Council,” Wikileaks, May 4 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USNATO165 a.html.
4.3.2.2 Visualizing Word Networks 
Primarily the Overview program groups and analyzes documents by 
content. Overview uncovers major content patterns in documents, and helps the 
researcher to identify key content patterns in each document. Examples of the 
key contents Overview detected within documents in the dataset are: energy, 
political, military, social/cultural, and criminal. The next analysis tool, Textexture, 
maps word relationships as a network. Word relationships include factors such 
as word frequency, word centrality (how central is the idea to the text as a 
whole), and word co-occurrence (words that appear frequently together). While 
Overview sheds light on key concepts in documents, this next step in the 
analytical process will detect major word relationships by viewing the entire 
corpus as one massive text. This approach aligns nicely with the theoretical 
approach of this paper to view the dataset as documenting a discourse. Word 
relationship network graphs provide another layer of insight into this intelligence 
discourse about Arctic and Russian issues.
To discover word relationships, I employed the help of Textexture, a 
program created by a text analytics firm, Nodus Labs, and specifically designed 
to analyze word relationships in a text using network graphs. Using mathematical 
and statistical processes the visualization program first identifies keywords in the 
text. Then, it calculates relationships between keywords using algorithms called 
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eccentricity valuation. Lastly, it 
maps the keywords and their relationships using nodes, edges, colors, size, and 
space to visually represent many aspects of the dataset’s word relationships.
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While both the Overview and Textexture programs help to visually 
synthesize a large body of text and highlight keywords and trends in content, the 
results of the Textexture visualization should be slightly different from Overview. 
Textexture should allow for more line-by-line analysis of content trends and, 
because it maps word relationships spatially, it can indicate patterns in word use 
with a level of nuance that the Overview program does not provide. The results of 
the Textexture program include detail about the discourse visualized as:
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Table 6 Parts of a word relationship graph
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nodes Nodes represent 100 key words, and are symbolized by colored dots 
that vary in size according to their "betweenness centrality.” 
Betweenness centrality determines a node’s centrality in the network by 
identifying the shortest paths through that node. Additionally, nodes that 
have more influence (or more connections) appear as larger dots.
edges Edges connect nodes with short lines between words used together, 
and longer lines for words less often used in conjunction with each 
other.
colors Colors represent groupings of words often used together
spacing Densely spaced nodes visualize words that are often used 
together, while sparsely or distantly spaced nodes visualize words 
that are less frequently used together. The words at the center of 
the visualization are frequently used together, while words at the 
periphery are less frequently used in the corpus. This force-based 
layout uses a system of attractions and repulsions according to 
similarity of or relational use.
By incorporating these details the Textexture software allows the researcher to 
take into account not only word frequency but also word proximity, key contexts, 
and the comparative significance of words used in the dataset. This process of
visualizing words as a relationship network provides further insight into the U.S. 
intelligence community’s perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic.
As mentioned above, Textexture organizes the text into edge, node, and 
color groups. Nodes represent words, colors represent thematic groupings, and 
edges link words. A mathematical equation akin to a physical force (like, for 
example, gravitational pull) is applied to edges and nodes, which gives the 
network a 3-D feel with a tensile sort of strength. Force is applied in opposite 
directions to create the Textexture graph. Nodes have a repulsive force while 
edges have an attractive force. The more edges a node has, the closer it will be 
drawn towards other nodes. The fewer edges a node has, the farther it will pull 
away from other nodes. Nodes, which visually represent a word’s significance in 
the text, provide a visual means of uncovering patterns in the text.
4.3.2.3 Visualizing Seventeen Secret Cables as a Network 
Below is a visualization of the seventeen secret State Department cables 
from this research project’s dataset.72 While the principles of discourse theory 
support the assumption that kernels of security fears would be ingrained 
throughout the dataset, it is prudent to examine these higher classification 
documents as a single unit to detect any isolated pockets of securitized fear or 
threat assessment. If a securitized dialogue is occurring in any subset, it will 
certainly be present in these seventeen items. If no securitized dialogue at all is 
taking place, then this subset of documents will be free of securitized sentiment.
72 "Department Of State Classification Guide (DSCG 05-01),” Department of State, January 2005, https://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dos-class.pdf.
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In Textexture visual items such as node location, size, and color tell a 
story about the text. This visualization provides the following insight into the 
discourse of Russian engagement in the Arctic taking place in these seventeen 
secret documents:
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Figure 10 Word Relationship Graph of Secret Classified documents
Major points of conversation include discussion of "NATO” and "defense;” 
however, the distance between the NATO and defense nodes indicates that
these issues are not strongly linked to one another. The pink "NATO” node is 
large and centrally located, while the green "defense” node resides in the 
southwestern quadrant of the graph. Recalling that force layout defines the use 
of space, it is useful to note how the "defense” node pulls toward nodes for 
"China” and "Russian,” and "NATO” pulls toward the "cooperation” node. This 
indicates that there is a stronger relationship among the words "China,”
"Russian,” and "defense” in these seventeen documents than there is between 
"NATO” and "defense.”
The network displayed above leads me to understand that "defense” is 
often discussed in reference to China and Russia, and is strongly tied to an 
"increase.” The program pinpoints every use of the word "increase” in these 17 
secret cables. These uses of "increase” include increased anxiety from the West 
as a result of Russian arms sales to Iran, increased Arctic shipping, increased 
defense measures on the part of Arctic states, increased collaboration between 
NATO and non-NATO European member Iceland, and concern stemming from 
increased Russian activity in Arctic airspaces. The exact text that ties "defense,” 
"China,” "Russia,” and "increase” together is a 2010 cable from the U.S. embassy 
in Oslo to multiple entities including the Defense Intelligence Agency, Secretary 
of State, and the Secretary of Defense regarding comments that Norwegian 
expert on Russia Anne Kjersti Karlsen made about China (as opposed to NATO
73and the theater of the Arctic) being Russia’s true security threat.73
73 "EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials.” Wikileaks, January 26 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OSLO45 a.html.
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The large "NATO” node represents text referring to "cooperation,” 
"discussion,” and "support.” This visualization indicates that the State Department 
employees sending these cables view NATO as an organization with potential for 
collaboration or support. The texts using the words "NATO” and "cooperation” 
reveal discussion of increased NATO cooperation between Arctic states, 
coordinated NATO exercises, and a comment about the lack of cooperation with 
non-NATO members (likely alluding to Russia). In the conversations captured by 
this dataset NATO is either seen as a collaborative force or as a failed 
collaborator. Either way, the graph documents ways in which NATO is being 
measured in terms of its collaborative capacity (or lack of capacity).
Applying this same visual analysis process to nodes connecting "Arctic,” 
"Russian,” and "Russia,” the largest nodes in the network are "ambassador” and 
"cooperation.” This suggests a political, rather than military, context and a 
cooperative thrust to the discourse. The words "Russia” and "cooperation” 
appear jointly twice: urging Russia to more fully engage in the NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC). Linking nodes "Russia,” "role,” and "defense” reveals 
conversations urging Russia to consider building missile defense instead of 
missiles. Nodes "security” and "defense” stem from a discussion of the political 
process to build up defense measures for improved security in Iceland, Norway, 
and Denmark. Nodes "Arctic” and "Russia” link to text about growing concerns 
regarding Russian involvement in the North; however, European political actors 
typically generated these comments. The U.S. cables summarize European 
political actors’ perspectives. This excerpt from a document reflects Iceland’s
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unease with the closing of the Keflavik air base in light of Russia’s increased 
activity in the Arctic: "To these observers the decision to close the base was a 
strategic mistake: climate change increased shipping routes and oil exploration in 
the North Atlantic and Arctic and a resurgent Russia will make the High North 
(and Iceland) more strategically significant in the future not less.”74 The cable’s 
author, U.S. Ambassador to Iceland Carol van Voorst, refers to a conversation 
among Icelandic politicians about the 2006 closure of the U.S. Naval Air base in 
Keflavik. Non-U.S. political actors express dissatisfaction with America’s weak 
presence in the Arctic.
These seventeen secret cables from the State Department do not 
document any highly securitized statements, and no securitized patterns emerge 
from the analysis tool. The content mentions the United States reducing military 
engagement in the Arctic region and it expresses European actors’ concern over 
the United States’ lack of engagement in the Arctic region. This content may 
reflect a perception that the United States is pushing other Arctic states to take 
responsibility for the defense of their homelands. Text reveals that these 
perceptions stem from U.S. foreign policy at this time, as even here, in secret 
cables selected to capture discourse on Russian engagement in the Arctic, 
conversations about the United States’ role in Afghanistan take primacy.
In more Arctic-specific statements, the discourse details enduring tensions 
in NATO-Russia relations and Western European state concerns over Russia’s
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74Amb. Carol van Voorst, "Icelandic Defense Policy One Year After U.S. Withdrawal,” Wikileaks, November 9 2007, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07REYKJAVIK322 a.html.
Arctic ambitions. U.S. actors discuss how to support cooperation with Russia in 
the Arctic in a manner that indicates that the Unite States views cooperation in 
the Arctic as a stepping-stone towards relationship-building with Russia. For 
instance, in a 2008 meeting of the United States-Canada Permanent Joint Board 
on Defense, attendees agreed "NORAD, NATO, and other allies and friends can 
send [a message of cooperation] by engaging the Russians where interests are 
shared, such as Afghanistan, non-proliferation, and search-and-rescue missions 
in the Arctic.”75 These conversations support my hypothesis that neither the U.S. 
intelligence nor the policy-making community securitized Russian engagement in 
the Arctic during this time.
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75 "US-Canada Permanent Joint Board On Defense (PJBD),” Wikileaks, December 2 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OTTAWA1508 a.html.
4.3.2.4 Content Patterns across the Entire Dataset 
Textexture is an excellent program for non-linear visualizations of text, but 
as a web-based program it does not have the capacity to visualize this project’s 
full text dataset. A different software platform is required for detecting trends and 
patterns that occur across the full dataset, a corpus that, in its entirety, includes 
upwards of 1,500,000 words. VOSViewer is free and open-source software that 
incorporates natural language processing (NLP) to graph word relationships in 
text. The visualization, similar to Textexture’s visualizations, incorporates nodes, 
edges, size, distance, and colors to map word networks. The VOSViewer word- 
map differs slightly from the Textexture program, in that VOSViewefs font, rather 
than its nodes, changes shape and color.
The visualization of the entire dataset is on the following page. To create 
this visualization, the program first analyzes the entire text of the dataset. This 
process includes detecting key terms, calculating the most significant (or central) 
of the key terms, determining a mathematical relationship between key terms, 
identifying sub-groupings of key terms, and then visualizing these key terms 
according to subgroup, significance, and relationship to other key terms. These 
key terms are also called noun phrases, and as demonstrated in the visualization 
that follows, many of the key terms are actually multi-word sequences. This 
process of determining noun phrases is an initial step in the NLP performed by 
VOS and explains why some nodes in the resultant visualization are multi-word 
items such as "climate change,” or "Bering Strait.” This multi-word approach
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using noun phrases allows the VOSViewer program to capture meaning that 
Textexture may not recognize.
VOSViewer s text analysis detects three major content groups in the 
dataset, visualized with three different colors, yellow, gray and orange. Loosely 
defined, the yellow text pertains to Arctic cooperative and political efforts. These 
include, for example, activities of NATO, Arctic Council, and other Arctic states. 
Several large-font words represent the most significant key terms of the dataset. 
These concepts dominate the yellow group, which covers about one fourth of the 
map. The key terms in the yellow text are: Arctic, cooperation, summary, east, 
NATO, and Afghanistan. These large nodes represent key themes in the dataset 
as a whole, and their dominance in the yellow group indicates that these items 
are often discussed in conjunction with one another. They comprise a micro­
network that contains the most significant items in the entire text base, "Arctic” 
and "cooperation.”
The gray text refers mostly to hydrocarbon and mineral extraction efforts 
in Russia, Russian political entities, and Russian economic or business interests. 
The largest font gray texts are "Gazprom,” "share,” "growth,” and "ruble.” The 
gray color group is the largest color-group; it dominates half of the map. Unlike 
the yellow color-group the gray group is comprised of many small-font texts. The 
gray group’s placement farther from the other two color groups illustrates the 
separate contexts of the topics of discussion. This means its content is taking 
place with high frequency but in a sub-set of the documents, and not widespread 
throughout the corpus. The software indicates that the gray group is a discrete
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sub-grouping of text that pertains to a diverse set of documents that discusses 
aspects of hydrocarbon and mineral extraction efforts in Russia, Russian political 
entities, and Russian economic or business interests.
The orange subgroup occupies the remaining quarter of the map; 
however, it contains smaller sized text. Its largest text bubbles are "TASS,” 
"Federation,” "attack,” "community,” and "corruption.” This color-group has the 
fewest large nodes and is the least dense. The orange subgroup generally 
pertains to criminal activities, demonstrated by text such as "investigator,” 
"prosecutor,” "attack,” "fight,” and "police.” The appearance of the subgroup 
indicates a potentially securitized discourse about crime regarding Russia. All 
told, however, these findings support my hypothesis of a non-securitized 
discourse about Russian engagement in the Arctic.
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When viewed as a whole, this dataset contains three main conversations, 
visualized as color groups. Most important to this inquiry, the dataset addresses 
"Arctic” "cooperation” that relates in some way to NATO, the United States, 
Afghanistan and Norway, as shown in yellow. This signifies that the Arctic is 
often seen as a region with potential for cooperation. However cooperation in this 
context is a complex and multi-directional concept. Given the variety of speakers 
and actors in this conversation, many forms of cooperation arise. A few examples 
of this Arctic cooperation discourse include:
• a 2006 cable documenting a desire to engage Russia via the United 
States and Norway on " ‘High North’ issues -- energy, the environment, 
non-proliferation and cooperation with Russia;”76
• A 2008 cable documenting "United States interest in dialogue and 
collaboration in the Arctic” with the Nordic Councils of Ministers;77
• a 2008 cable documenting comments of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political-Military Affairs stressing "increased United States-High 
North engagement, noting broad support for Norway's initiative and our 
shared interest in cooperation in the region and in dealing with Russia.”78 
A header in the document, "Stroking the Norwegians on High North,”
76 Amb. Benson Whitney, “Ambassador’s Introductory Call On Deputy FM Stubholt Centers On High North,” Wikileaks, January 26 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06OSLO86 a.html.
77 Amb. James P. Cain, "Nordic Council Open To Renewable Energy R&D Partnership Idea,” Wikileaks, September 19 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08COPENHAGEN499 a.html.
78 "A/S Kimmitt’s October 15-16 Visit To Oslo,” Wikileaks, October 29 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OSLO582 a.html.
illustrates a conscious U.S. effort to support Norwegian engagement with 
Russia in the matter of the ‘High North,’ a Norwegian and Canadian term 
for their Arctic regions;
• a 2009 cable capturing Canadian cynicism over cooperation with Russia, 
NATO, Afghanistan and the Arctic;79
• a 2009 cable capturing Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko’s comments on 
Russian concerns about security cooperation with NATO and priorities of 
the Arctic;80 and
• a 2010 document about NATO bilateral meetings: "on the margins of the 
January 14 NATO Strategic Concept Seminar EUR/RPM Director Bruce 
Turner, DCM, and PolOff conducted bilateral meetings January 13 to 
discuss Afghanistan, NATO, Russia, and the Arctic High North.” 81
Arctic cooperation in this discourse is a matter of desire (United States, NATO 
and Norwegian), strategy (United States), and derision (Canada, Russia). That 
being said, the text that is closest to and comparable in size to "cooperation” is 
"Arctic.” In the entire dataset "Arctic” and "cooperation” have the strongest edge 
with 236 co-occurrences. This demonstrates these two key contexts are most 
significantly and frequently used together.
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79 "Canada’s ‘Calibrated’ Re-Engagement With Russia In Step With U.S.,” Wikileaks, April 7 2009 https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09OTTAWA278 a.html.
80 Amb. John Beyrle, "DFM Grushko On Georgia, Energy Security, And European Security.” Wikileaks, February 13, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MOSCOW355_a.html.
81 "EUR/RPM Director Discusses NATO, Arctic, And Afghanistan With Norwegian Officials.” Wikileaks, January 26 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OSLO45 a.html.
The gray color group represents a tendency of the dataset to discuss 
hydrocarbon industry and the Russian economy. Gazprom and Rosneft are two 
of the largest nodes, and they connect through edges to such terms as pipeline, 
share, growth, investor, ruble, loan, shareholder, and barrel. Key terms such as 
share, growth, investor, shareholder, and loan indicate a business context in the 
dataset. Key terms pipeline, barrel, and exploration highlight the role 
hydrocarbons in the Russian economy in this dataset, while also illustrating their 
connection to Gazprom and Rosneft. This color grouping is the largest of the 
dataset, indicating that most significant items in the dataset pertain to 
hydrocarbon industries. The orange color group represents the smallest 
subgroup of the dataset. This aspect of the conversation highlights criminal 
activity with large nodes for "corruption,” "attack,” "fight,” and "police.”
VOSViewer reveals significant content patterns in the dataset. These 
include content about Arctic cooperation in regards to NATO, Norway, the United 
States and Afghanistan, content about Russian energy firms Gazprom and 
Rosneft, and content about criminal activity in Russia. The findings of this content 
analysis provide no indication of widespread securitization of Russian 
engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s within the intelligence data set.
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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Russian working-level coordinator of 
the Environment Working Group under the Bilateral 
Presidential Commission told us on December 11 that the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) would 
likely be interested in working with the United States under 
the Working Group on biodiversity, protected territories, 
chemical and waste management, environmental governance, 
technological issues, and climate change. However, the 
Ministry's leadership is not focused on the Working Group, 
and the Foreign Ministry has not issued guidance to MNRE on 
the Working Group’s functioning or instructions to formulate 
an agenda for cooperation. He further cautioned that Working 
Group projects should first be discussed and developed on the 
working level. He criticized how the United States developed 
and presented its recent working-level proposal to jump-start 
cooperation to reduce black carbon emissions in the Arctic. 
Since it was not discussed with Russian experts in advance, 
it was "poorly developed" and stands "no chance" of Russian 
approval. The MFA's Senior Arctic Official on December 14
Figure 12 A Cable on Wikileaks
4.3.2.5 Word Networks Summary 
There is no strong indication in either the seventeen secret cables or in 
the entire dataset that the Arctic is discussed in a predominantly securitized tone. 
In the seventeen cables the discourse pertains to collaborative or European 
security efforts, and efforts to better determine the role of the United States,
NATO and the Arctic Council in security efforts. While the dataset includes 
references to concern about Russian activity and future planning for the Arctic, 
these reflect Icelandic and Norwegian concerns. Nothing in the seventeen secret 
cables indicates U.S. securitization of Russian engagement in the Arctic. 
Discourse patterns in the entire discourse as visualized for key term trends, 
significance, and relationships indicate that first and foremost the United States is 
interested in Arctic cooperation, followed by close monitoring of Russian energy 
companies Gazprom and Rosneft. Lastly, the entire dataset reveals a sub­
grouping of interest in criminal activity in Russia and references to Afghanistan. 
Concepts such as threat, risk, and fear are notably absent in the 
analysis/visualization.
4.3.3 Location Analysis 
Using a text analysis tool I extracted all location entities from the dataset 
including both Cablegate and GI Files documents. Note that these location 
entities were extracted from all text, including sending information. After much 
data-cleaning to remove non-locations (such as company names and names of 
people), the locations "Arctic” and "Russia” (as these location names were the
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selection criteria for the dataset and would have been in almost all documents), 
and continent names (which could not functionally be visualized), there remained 
6,722 geographic location entities. Many of these were the same location 
mentioned repeatedly. At 461 times, Moscow was mentioned the most frequently 
in the entire dataset. Below is a map showing all location entities mentioned and 
visualized by geographic location and frequency of mention.
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Figure 13 Point location entities
This visualization shows how the densest and most frequently mentioned
locations are in Western Europe and the Middle East. Russian locations include
mentions along the Russian Arctic coast, but elsewhere as well. Russian
locations are often Arctic and non-Arctic oil or gas fields, political hotspots in non-
Arctic regions such as the Caucasus, Chechnya, and political centers such as
Moscow and St. Petersburg. Outside of the two major metropolises, Russian
location mentions are relatively geographically consistent across populated areas 
in both density and frequency. With the exception of the Moscow outlier, the 
number of locations mentioned in Russia, however, is certainly not more than in 
other parts of the world; in fact, it is on par with location mentions in Africa or 
South America.
This visualization illustrates that during this time period, U.S. intelligence 
was more concerned with political and economic events happening in the 
traditional centers of Western economic and political activity than with 
surveillance of specific Russian localities. Another way to interpret this is that 
U.S. intelligence is more concerned with developments in Europe, the Middle 
East, and Northern Africa than it is with specific developments in the Russian 
Arctic. Given U.S. engagement in the Middle East during this time, this makes 
sense. The map certainly does not indicate a securitized stance regarding 
Russian activities in the Arctic. In fact, it suggests a lack of interest.
Traditional U.S. partners in the Arctic within NATO or the UN receive more 
geographic mentions than Russian Arctic locations. Perhaps U.S. is more intent 
on monitoring Arctic partners than it is on monitoring Arctic Russia. Alternatively, 
the map may reflect the fact that Moscow and St. Petersburg are centers of 
decision-making in Russia. They, rather than remote Arctic locations, may 
therefore attract the interest of the U.S. intelligence community.
Whatever the reason, in terms of location entity and frequency of mention 
across the dataset, there does not appear to be intense or focused interest either 
in Russian geographic locations, in Russian Arctic locations, or in Arctic locations
141
at all. The location data from the data set indicates that the Russian Arctic is 
either treated here as a periphery to Moscow’s core, or the Arctic as a whole is a 
peripheral concern to the intelligence gathering places in these pages.
This raises the question, what do these locations say about the IC and the 
Arctic? Why are there not more mentions of other locations? The dataset 
contains little to no mention of U.S. sub-Arctic or Arctic locations; in fact the 
island nation of Trinidad and Tobago is mentioned more often (5 times) than 
Anchorage, which is Alaska’s economic center (3 times). Alaska itself receives as 
many mentions (18) as Indonesia, New Delhi, and Vienna. Specific locations that 
fall within the Arctic geographical region are not the focal point of specific 
geographic points mentioned in this dataset.
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Table 7 Fifty most frequently mentioned locations in the dataset 
Legend:Burnt Sienna Arctic Council member state or decision-making center o f Arctic nationMarigold Arctic Council observer states and their respective decision-making centersLight Grey Neighbors to Arctic nations or non-Arctic cities in Arctic nationsCharcoal Oil-producing or pipeline transit nations
Moscow 461 China 184 Afghanistan 152 St. Petersburg 140 Germany 135
Georgia 121 Norway 118 London 114 Iran 107 Soviet Union 105
France 101 Middle East 100 Canada 88 Turkey 88 Poland 83
Black Sea 82 Kazakhstan 75 Arctic Ocean 73 India 73 Finland 71
Sweden 67 Libya 64 New York 63 N. Caucasus 62 England 60
Japan 59 North Sea 57 Chechnya 53 Oslo 51 Azerbaijan 49
Brazil 48 Bulgaria 48 Pakistan 48 Caucasus 46 Iraq 46
Italy 46 Czech Rep. 45 Greece 43 Barents Sea 42 Denmark 42
Beijing 41 Spain 41 South Korea 39 Israel 37 Syria 36
Baltic Sea 35 Gulf of Mexico 35 North Korea 35 Paris 35 Baltic 33
The fifty most mentioned locations in the dataset show a loose pattern of 
Arctic locations, political or geographic centers of Arctic nations, and Arctic 
Council observer states; these comprise a good two-thirds of the geographic 
mentions. Arctic-bordering nations or localities make up another group. The 
remaining location entities have one obvious commonality: they are either oil or 
gas producing or transit nations.
Of the fifty most-mentioned locations in the data set only twelve are Arctic
82nations or decision-making centers82 of Arctic nations. These locations are 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Norway, the Soviet Union, Canada, Arctic Ocean,
82 While New York is a decision-making center for the US, an Arctic nation, for the purposes of this work it will not be considered an Arctic decision-making center.
Finland, Sweden, North Sea, Oslo, Barents Sea, and Denmark. Arctic Council 
observer states and decision-making centers83 mentioned are China, Germany, 
London, France, Poland, India, England, Japan, Italy, Beijing, Spain, South 
Korea and Paris. Counting the fifty most mentioned locations this way, half of the 
most mentioned locations are Arctic Council members or observers. To extend 
the geographic criteria to include areas bordering Arctic nations, the handful of 
remaining locations are all oil-producing or pipeline-crossing locations84 
(Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, Turkey, Libya, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Czech Republic, Greece, Israel, Syria, Gulf of Mexico) as well as 
locations of national interest to the United States (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran) in the 
timeframe of the dataset (2004 - 2011). Location mentions imply that the 
intelligence in this dataset is primarily concerned with global oil-production, 
Western centers of governance, and Arctic Council member states. There is no 
noticeable focus on location points in the Russian Arctic, leading me to conclude 
that there was no specific interest in developments taking place in Russian Arctic 
locales.
144
83 Specifically; London, Beijing and Paris
84 “World Pipelines Maps - Crude Oil (petroleum) Pipelines - Natural Gas Pipelines - Products Pipelines,” Theodora.com, May 6, 2008,http://www.theodora.com/pipelines/world oil gas and products pipelines.html.
4.3.4 Summary of the Micro-Level Analysis 
This portion of the analysis examined content for patterns that helped 
profile the intelligence contained in this dataset. Sentiment analysis was not 
conclusive; however, it did not demonstrate a securitized leaning. This 
conclusion rests on the fact that analysis tools detected only 29 percent of the 
documents in the dataset to have a negative sentiment. Content analysis using 
the document-sorting tool Overview detected that the dataset had content groups 
pertaining to Russian energy industry, Russian political actors and groups, 
international energy companies, crime, legality and emergencies. Content 
analysis of the seventeen secret cables as a word relationship network using the 
graphing tool Textexture revealed a political and diplomatic leaning to the 
dataset. The most significant word in the graph, “NATO,” is strongly and often 
linked to ideas of “cooperation.” Line by line analysis of occurrences of the 
significant word “defense” reveals no strongly securitized discussion that falls out 
of the realm of normal political and diplomatic dialogue. My line-by-line analysis 
supports this visual analysis. Content analysis of all text using the VOSViewer 
program reveals three major content groups. These groups pertain to 
cooperative political efforts in the Arctic, the energy industry in Russia, and 
criminal / legal issues in Russia. The data visualization tools VOSViewer, 
Textexture, and Overview do not reveal securitized conversations in the dataset. 
These findings differ in their content analysis results; however, my line-by-line 
analysis supports the non-securitized claim.
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The words “Arctic” and “cooperation” are the largest nodes in VosViewer 
and are so closely linked in the dataset as to be visually represented as 
overlapping. Far from indicating a securitized dialogue, the analysis illuminates a 
very diplomatic and even congenial tone. Russia is discussed in terms of its 
energy industry and legal/corruption issues. Location analysis supported these 
findings as the top fifty most-mentioned locations were in Arctic Council member 
states, observer states, or energy producing or energy-transit states. Absent from 
larger scale content trends are sub-national Russian Arctic leaders and mentions 
of permanent participants to the Arctic Council. Content about the Arctic Council 
demonstrates United States support for the governing body.
Content analysis performed in different ways with different analytical tools 
and subsections of the data consistently supports a narrative of U.S. diplomatic 
efforts in the Arctic, including through the Arctic Council, and a view of Russian 
Arctic engagement as economically focused; that is, focused on the Russian 
energy industry.
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4.4 Macro-Analysis 
The final phase of analysis focuses on the inter-textual dialogue between 
intelligence documents and seven U.S. Arctic policy documents, looking for 
similar patterns in the intelligence and policy. My purpose is not to assert 
causality, or even to detect whether influence is created passively or actively, 
directionally, and so on. I merely seek to determine whether intelligence 
discourses agree with policy discourses in regards to Russian Arctic 
engagement. Building on Foucault’s theories of discursive formations, I assume 
that a degree of shared content and seemingly shared values indicate agreement 
between these two different groups: intelligence analysts and policy makers. By 
applying the previously used tools for content, location and sentiment analysis to 
seven U.S. Arctic policy documents, I expect to detect a shared discursive stance 
between intelligence documents and U.S. Arctic policy documents.
While ultimately the project’s aim is to detect whether intelligence or policy 
securitized Russian engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s, I also aim to 
detect and explain any major differences between this dataset’s intelligence and 
policy documents. For instance, I expect that policy will not contain frank 
language about threat and risk. I expect intelligence documents to reflect a 
higher degree of frankness. Policy is official, public, and enduring. I expect that 
policy sentiment will be neutral or even positive as its language may reflect a 
desire to project optimism. Additionally, policy is less likely to be specific, and 
when compared to intelligence it will carry less nuanced detail about places, 
people, and events of concern. In policy documents, location entities likely will be
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more regional or generalized in nature. Policy is more likely to reference 
domestic actors and locations, whereas intelligence is more concerned with 
monitoring “the other,” and is less likely to focus on domestic issues. In summary, 
policy is likely to be more homogenous and vague and is expected to be more 
aspirational in tone and more domestic-minded.
Before launching into the macro-analysis, I will recap the most pertinent 
findings from the micro and meso-level analyses. Firstly, recall that the 
intelligence documents in the dataset are predominantly open source private 
intelligence or unclassified or confidential State Department cables. Therefore, I 
can only draw conclusions based on what these documents reveal. It is possible 
that other documents would reveal a more securitized U.S. stance on Russian 
engagement in the Arctic.
Secondly, tagging patterns and sending habits on these cables indicate 
that the State Department viewed Russian engagement in the Arctic as a political 
affair, and far less a defense concern. One could argue that the dataset would 
naturally lean towards diplomatic categorization, given its origin in the State 
Department. The State Department’s option for categorizing information as a 
defense or military affair was nevertheless underutilized in the dataset. Tagging 
and recipient information emphasize Arctic states and international organizations 
such as NATO, the UN, and the EU. Other types of Arctic stakeholders: 
indigenous political entities, international environmental groups, industry 
organizations, or, even domestic political leaders in Alaska were not among the 
top recipients of these cables. These patterns corroborate a perception within the
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State Department of Russian engagement in the Arctic as "politics as usual.” The 
cables reflect dialogue among nation states with established and cordial power 
dynamics. The tagging and sending patterns also suggest that the U.S. State 
Department associates the Arctic with European politics.
Location entities mentioned in both State Department cables and Stratfor 
internal emails display a wide geographic spread, with a higher frequency of 
Western European locations. Few Arctic geographic locations appear, and no 
pattern of focus in Russian Arctic locations arises. This pattern indicates that 
both Stratfor and the State Department view Arctic and Russian Arctic issues as 
falling under the purview of traditional geographic and political centers of 
influence. Both Stratfor and the State Department view Arctic concerns through a 
geopolitical lens. Moreover, the drivers of Arctic developments reside in Moscow 
and other European capital cities south of the Arctic Circle. This perception aligns 
with centuries of core-periphery relations between the Arctic and southern power 
centers.
In the following section I compare the findings from meso- and micro-level 
analysis of intelligence documents with content, location and sentiment analysis 
of seven U.S. Arctic policy documents. Although these documents will look and 
feel different from the intelligence documents, this section will emphasize similar 
patterns to shed light on why the United States did not securitize Russian 
engagement in the Arctic.
149
150
4.4.1 Content Analysis Comparing Intelligence and Policy 
The seven U.S. Arctic policy documents in question were issued between 
2009 and 2015. With the exception of assessments produced by the Government 
Accountability Office, these seven documents comprise all existing national and 
agency level policy documents specifically pertaining to the U.S. Arctic. Given 
policy creation cycles, it stands to reason that intelligence collected during 2007 
-  2011 would inform (at least in some way) policies published from 2009 to 2013.
The policies published in 2014 and 2015 are the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Arctic Action Plan, and an executive order 
from President Obama. Because NOAA is unlikely to rely heavily on intelligence 
from the State Department or Stratfor, and because 2014 and 2015 were 
significantly different geopolitical contexts from the latest intelligence in the 
dataset, these two documents will serve as a check, or “control group,” on my 
analysis of the interplay between intelligence and policy in the earlier era. I 
expect the tone of these documents to be significantly different from the 2009 
and 2013 documents generated by the President, Department of Defense (DOD), 
United States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Navy.
In 2009, the U.S. government published one major Arctic document, the 
National Security Presidential Directive 66 (NSPD-66). The NSPD-66 stressed 
homeland security, protection of Arctic resources, sustainable economic 
development, and collaborative international governance. While U.S. Arctic- 
related policy and legislation pre-dates the NSPD-66 (including boundary 
agreements with Canada/Britain and Russia/USSR), the NSPD-66 is considered
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the first modern policy document to specify the United States’ approach to 
protecting and developing its Arctic region. Following the Bush Administration’s 
NSPD-66, the executive branch produced no policy on the Arctic until 2013, 
when the Obama Administration produced the National Strategy for the Arctic 
Region.85 The 2013 National Strategy represents an unprecedented and 
comprehensive policy document on the U.S. Arctic, and is recognized as such by 
official Arctic strategy documents from federal agencies including the U.S. 
Department of Defense (2013)86 and the USCG (2013).87
U.S. federal agencies released three major policy documents in 2014 
including the Executive’s Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region,88 the U.S. Navy’s "Arctic Roadmap,”89 and NOAA’s "Arctic Action 
Plan.”90 So far 2015 has already seen two significant developments, an 
Executive Order to "Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic”91
85 "National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” The White House, 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat arctic strategy.pdf.
86 "Arctic Strategy,” Department of Defense, 2013,http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2013 Arctic Strategy.pdf.
87 "United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy,” United States Coast Guard, 2013, http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CG Arctic Strategy.pdf.
88 "Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.” The White House, 2014. http://arctic.gov/publications/related/imp plan for natl strategy for arctic region.pdf.
89 "U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 -  2030,” Navy Task Force for Climate Change, Chief of Naval Operations, n.d., http://www.navy.mil/docs/USN arctic roadmap.pdf.
90 "NOAA’s Arctic Action Plan: Supporting the National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” NOAA, 2014, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/NOAAarcticactionplan2014.pdf.
91 "Executive Order - Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic,” Whitehouse.gov, Accessed March 10, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/executive- order-enhancing-coordination-national-efforts-arctic.
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and a controversial step by President Obama to protect ANWR, presented via
92video on the Whitehouse YouTube channel.92
4.4.1.1 Sentiment Analysis and Keyword Entity Comparing Intelligence and
Policy
Sentiment analysis performed by AlchemyAPI found all seven policy 
documents to be positive in sentiment. While I expected a tendency towards 
neutral sentiment in the policy documents, consistently positive sentiment is not 
surprising. The content of these documents is largely aspirational; content makes 
repeated references to hopes and expectations for the Arctic region. The 
documents consistently emphasize peaceful cooperation in the Arctic and 
American desires for good stewardship of Arctic resources. The AlchemyAPI 
program designates these aspirational sentiments, even those in DOD 
documents, as positive.
As a control, I examined the sentiment of the 2010 New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (New START) to see whether its tone would reflect perceptions 
of risk or threat.93 START addresses a securitized issue that is contemporary 
(with the dataset) and content-related, but not contained within the policy dataset. 
Interestingly, AlchemyAPI also detected positive document sentiment within New 
START. The document certainly addresses a tense issue, and a defense issue;
92 Protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, The White House, accessed March 10, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hey WIAFVA&feature=youtu.be.
93 “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms,” US Department of State, 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.
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however, the treaty reflects successful diplomatic handling of a defense issue. In 
contrast, Alchemy detects negative sentiment in the 2003 U.S. federal policy on 
Iraq.94 These examples illustrate that not all policy on securitized issues will 
exhibit neutral or negative sentiment, and that a fully securitized issue can evoke 
positive sentiment in policy. AlchemyAPI’s detection of positive sentiment in all 
seven U.S. Arctic policy documents in this research project’s dataset may 
support my hypothesis of a lack of national security threat from the Arctic overall, 
and a lack of threat detected from Russian engagement in the area, although I 
can draw no firm conclusions based on this particular phase of the analysis.
Another interesting finding illuminated by AlchemyAPI concerns the 
keyword entity "Russia” (also "Russian Federation”) in these documents. The 
AlchemyAPI program found that the seven policy documents either made no 
mention of Russia or mentioned Russia in a positive or neutral tone. None of the 
seven documents demonstrate negative sentiment towards the entity Russia or 
the Russian Federation. In fact, they seldom mention Russia or the Federation. 
Policy documents reveal no overt concern that the government or government 
agencies may have about the U.S.’ Arctic neighbor to the west.
154
94 "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” National Security Council, November 30 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113000376.html.
4.4.1.2 Document Sorting and Word Relationship Graphs 
I employed the Overview program again to reveal content patterns in the 
seven Arctic policies. This process compares the key terms of all seven 
documents to determine similarities among the documents. Overview then 
groups similar and dissimilar documents in a document tree, and identifies key 
words in the document groupings and, ultimately, the entire corpus. Below I 
provide a summary of the key findings of the content analysis performed by the 
Overview program. Following this summary of findings I analyze how these 
findings pertain to the question of securitization of Russian engagement in the 
Arctic in U.S. policy and intelligence. According to Overview’s algorithmic 
processing, the most common words shared by the seven U.S. Arctic policy 
documents are Alaska, environment, indigenous, Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, DOD, 
airspace, progress, Alaska native, and offshore. These key words are quite 
different than those Overview detected within the intelligence dataset. Indigenous 
concerns and U.S. domestic concerns were not key topics in the intelligence 
dataset; however, they are front and center in the policy dataset. Specific 
mentions of U.S. federal agencies are self-references and will be disregarded for 
that reason. Remaining key items, environment, airspace, progress, and offshore 
are interesting. The word “environment” (or “environmental”) is mentioned in all 
policy documents. The word “progress” is mentioned in all documents with the 
exception of the DOD Arctic policy, the NSPD, and the USCG document. 
“Airspace” is mentioned in three of the policy documents: the 2013 DOD 
document, the 2014 Implementation plan, and the National Strategy document.
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Only two documents mention "offshore,” and these are the 2013 Implementation 
Plan and the 2013 USCG document.
Overview groups the 2009 NSPD, the 2013 U.S. Coast Guard Arctic 
Strategy, the 2013 National Arctic Strategy and the Implementation plan under 
the same document tree. This demonstrates similarity of content through a 
similarity of word usage. The 2014 Navy Arctic Roadmap, 2013 DOD Arctic 
Strategy, and the 2015 Executive Order fall into individual document trees, 
demonstrating more unique content. Below is a table highlighting the keywords 
detected by Overview by policy document.
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Table 8 Key content in each policy document
Year Title Overview’s key 
words
Categorization
2009 NSPD
66
hydrocarbon, coordination, agencies shall, carrying
verbs, future // industry concerns, intergovernmental collaboration to achieve goals
2013 USCG offshore, northern/north, bering, coast guard
industry, shipping / vessel traffic route
2013 EXE - IMP end of, progress, next steps, measuring, department of
coordination, logistical planning, marking progress towards goal
2013 EXE airspace, peaceful, conflict, indigenous, Alaska, mapping, environment
some defense / security (airspace, conflict), however this is balanced by research (mapping), “environment” and “indigenous” content, seen as “Alaska” not, for example: “nation”
2013 DOD DoD, desired, department, “defense arctic,” DHS, Navy, airspace
“department” and “defense arctic” likely come from the document name “department of defense arctic strategy,” seen as an inter-agency issue involving DOD, DHS, Navy, and airspace concerns
2014 Navy USCG, naval, “navy will,” Route, Cold, Sea
USCG and Navy joint issue, future intention (as opposed to current action), likely “Route” is reference to NSR, capitalized “Cold” refers to a few mentions of the Cold War, a few mentions to the U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook, the annual Cold Response exercise, and the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (ACRREL)
2014 NOAA NOP, NSAR, IARPC, NMFS National groups, policies and agencies that operate in the Arctic including: the National Ocean Policy (NOP), National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR), Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
2015 EXE - ORD “Alaska native,” “nativeorganizations,” chair, “tribal governments,” “officer”
indigenous government, domestic sub-state political organizations and actors
As expected, none of the policy documents, including policies from Department
of Defense and Navy make a strong securitized stance. This finding affirms my
hypothesis that U.S. Arctic policy was not and is not widely securitized.
Content analysis performed using the visualization program Textexture
identifies the key words Arctic, united, state, (coming from the entity the United
States), and region. Russia does not feature prominently in the visualization,
meaning that it is not mentioned frequently in the text of the dataset. Likewise,
the word defense does not dominate. The program identifies the most influential
contexts in this text as:
#0: arctic region including nation#1: state united international cooperation#2: effort line principle opportunity#3: resource energy development management
These influential contexts, as the program calls them, do not indicate any
securitized language. Instead, these policies appear to be more concerned with
cooperation and sustainable management of resources.
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4.4.2 Arctic Policy Location Entities 
Below is a map (Figure 15) of all location entities mentioned in U.S. Arctic 
policy documents. Visualizing this data as a map provides a complete and 
systematic view of the specific geographies of concern for U.S. Arctic policy­
makers. This concern could have a securitized focus or a political focus; only my 
examination of the text line by line will reveal the nature of the concern. Certain 
locations carry obvious significance, while other locations have a more 
ambiguous context that requires referencing the original document. For example, 
the mention of Fort Wainwright in Alaska likely refers to a security or defense 
issue: it is a U.S. Army base. A mention of Murmansk, a port city in Russia, 
however, that is home to an Arctic naval fleet and oil and gas development may 
have significance in a security context or as an industry hub.
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Location Entities in US Arctic Policy Documents 
2009-2015
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Figure 14 Location entities in U.S. Arctic policy documents
Geographic locations mentioned in high frequency in U.S. Arctic policy are
the eight Arctic nations, the Arctic Ocean and locations in the Arctic and sub­
Arctic region, such as the Arctic Basin and the Faroe Islands. The documents 
reference the United States and Alaska frequently. Compared to the map of 
location entities in the intelligence dataset, there is a significantly higher number 
of references to Alaska and Alaskan locations. Arctic Council observer states 
India, China, Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Poland 
received a few mentions each; while the observer states Netherlands and 
Singapore are not mentioned. Island locations such as Tasmania and Hawaii, 
and locations such as the Great Lakes in the Midwestern U.S. and Montreal also 
are mentioned - locations not obviously related to the Arctic. The policy
documents tend to reference Arctic Council member states and observer states, 
which indicates support for the work of the Arctic Council and its consensus- 
based approach to Arctic governance.
The density of Alaskan location entities (see Figure 16) includes mentions 
to ports and fishing hubs such as Norton Sound, Bristol Bay and Dutch Harbor, 
villages such as Kivalina (population 377 in 2000 census) and Beaver (population 
84 in 2000 census), industry hubs such as Nome (mining), North Slope Borough 
and Barrow (oil and gas), the military base Fort Wainwright, and population 
centers, such as Barrow and Anchorage.
These policy documents do not mention Juneau, the state capital, or 
Fairbanks, Alaska’s second largest city and home to University of Alaska 
Fairbanks (UAF), the state’s land, space, and sea grant institution. Juneau’s 
absence in the dataset is not surprising, given that American defense policy 
emanates from Washington, DC.
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Location Entities in US Arctic Policy Documents 2009 - 2015
Figure 15 Location entities in U.S. Arctic policy documents
Maritime Arctic and sub-Arctic references include the East Bering Sea,
Pacific Arctic Ocean, Greenland Sea, Hudson Strait, Hudson Bay, Labrador Sea,
Chukchi Sea, and sea routes such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The
frequency of maritime locations illustrates concern for Arctic waterways,
suggesting a corresponding interest in the shipping and fishing industries,
possibly in seafaring fleets and in environmental concerns. The Caribbean Sea,
Panama Canal, and Gulf of Mexico are also mentioned, most likely for their
transit and industry capacities. The NSR is mentioned more than forty times,
while the lesser Arctic passages are not a focal point of the dataset. The 
Northwest Passage (NWP) is mentioned seven times in the dataset, the 
Northeast Passage (NEP) is mentioned once, and the Transpolar Sea Route 
(TSR) is not mentioned at all.
From a defense perspective, the policy documents mention Thule in 
Greenland and the Thule Airbase. The documents make one mention of Fort 
Wainwright, Alaska. No mention is made of Alaska’s Elmendorf Air Force Base, 
which is home to the Alaskan NORAD Region, Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK) 
and the Alaskan Command (ALCOM). Kodiak, home of the U.S. Coast Guard in 
Alaska, is mentioned twice. The Coast Guard forward operating location (FOL) of 
Barrow is also mentioned twice; however no specific mention is made of the U.S. 
Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak. This absence of references to military 
installations is not unique to Alaska. The only mention of a defense installation in 
an Arctic nation is Thule.
Nor are Russian political centers Moscow and St. Petersburg mentioned.
In fact no mention at all is made of any land-based Russian geographies. Policy 
does, however, mention several Russian Arctic maritime features, including the 
Barents, Kara, White, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi Seas and the Northern 
Sea Route.
In U.S. Arctic policy documents the most mentioned location entities are 
Alaskan, Alaskan coastal, European, and Arctic water bodies. Policy documents 
contain geographically distributed references to Arctic bodies of water, which 
include Arctic and sub-Arctic seas, oceans straits and bays surrounding Alaska,
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Canada, Greenland, Scandinavia and all along the long Russian Arctic coastline. 
Policy documents mention predominantly coastal locations known for their 
mining, fishing, oil and gas extraction, or shipping industries, demonstrating an 
industry-leaning or an oceans-focus in policy-makers’ understanding of the 
Arctic.
Both policy and intelligence highlight Arctic Council member states and 
observer states, however most locations mentioned lie in Western Europe and 
the Northeast United States. While U.S. intelligence in the dataset mentions 
Middle Eastern locations and Russian land-based locations, U.S. Arctic policy 
documents do not. Neither intelligence nor policy documents place consistent 
emphasis on defense or security geographic locations. Similar patterning of 
location references reinforce the theory that the policy and intelligence 
communities treat the Arctic as a region of political interest that also concerns the 
Arctic Council and Western-European entities. This emphasis in policy 
documents supports my hypothesis of a perception of low threat emanating from 
Russian engagement in the Arctic.
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4.4.3 Summary
Arctic policy is a finalized product that incorporates intelligence from many 
sources and is influenced by numerous stakeholders. Analysis tools led me to 
conclude that policy documents reflect an even lesser degree of alarm or threat 
detection from Russian engagement in the Arctic than seen in the intelligence 
documents. This is in part due to the aspirational and hopeful forward-looking 
tone of these Arctic policy documents. The measured tone of the policy 
documents reflects U.S. interest in engaging in the Arctic collaboratively with 
other Arctic and European states. It could also reflect the influence of other 
strains of intelligence or other stakeholder opinions. Arctic policy exhibits 
influence from other actors than Stratfor and the State Department, in its 
references to indigenous and Alaskan affairs, topics not emphasized in either of 
the intelligence datasets. This is expected: numerous constituencies and 
stakeholders influence U.S. Arctic policy.
Even personal typologies of individuals in positions of power, their job 
functions, and organizational culture affect policy documents. Writes James 
McCormick in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: "the personal 
characteristics of individuals (personality traits, perceptions, and psychological 
predispositions), the role responsibilities that the individual assumes within the 
decision process (as president, national security adviser, or secretary of
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treasury), and the differing bureaucratic environments (the FBI versus the CIA, 
for instance) in which individuals operate affect policy choices.”95
Intelligence, while striving to operate in a separate sphere from policy so
as to remain untainted by political influence, can never truly escape the influence
from policymakers’ and politics. McCormick discusses the myriad opportunities
for the politicization of intelligence, noting,
politicization of intelligence can take many forms, from the most blatant, in which intelligence is explicitly told what conclusions it should reach, to the less obvious, including demoting people who produce the ‘wrong’ answer, putting in place personnel whose views are consistent with those of the top leaders, reducing the resources going to units whose analyses are troubling, and the operation of unconscious bias by analysts who fear that their careers will be damaged by producing undesired reports. Even more elusive may be what one analyst has called ‘politicization by omission.”96
Intelligence, like all speech and text, is a part of the transactional exchanges of
power that shape identities, create meaning, and communicate desires, fears
and perceptions about the world. This research project recognizes the multitudes
of influences upon policies, while at the same time acknowledging the possibility
that State Department and Stratfor intelligence may be among these influencers.
Both the policy and intelligence datasets analyzed in this project show a
propensity to refer to and document engagement with Western European political
power centers. Both datasets have documented concern for the energy industry.
Both datasets view the Arctic as a region of political and economic interest, and,
to a lesser degree, a defense concern.
95 James M. McCormick, The Domestic Sources o f American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 16.96 Ibid, 280.
To recapitulate, I find U.S. Arctic policy to be less securitized than 
intelligence documents. While policy does mention security and defense 
concerns shared by Arctic partners such as Norway and Canada, and domestic 
partnerships between U.S. federal agencies, these references all take the tone of 
"normal” diplomatic discussions. Ultimately, both policy and intelligence analyzed 
in this project demonstrate a non-securitized tone.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This project’s intelligence dataset would not have been available for study 
without the efforts of Wikileaks and the work of whistleblowers and hacktivists 
such as Chelsea Manning and Anonymous. Outsiders are not meant to study the 
intelligence community. Intelligence organizations rely on secrecy. Wikileaks’ 
work in the arena of government transparency has allowed me not only to read 
secret and internal documents that pertain to Arctic affairs, but by making this 
information freely accessible and downloadable, Wikileaks has made deep 
analysis of this discourse possible.
That being said, the multi-faceted analysis of more than 600 documents 
performed in this thesis reveals that this secrecy is largely unwarranted. The 
perceptions of Russian engagement in the Arctic captured in this intelligence 
dataset do not appear to differ greatly from widespread public opinion of Russian 
behavior readily accessible in the news media and in foreign policy forums. In 
fact, opinions expressed in the media by some high-ranking intelligence and 
defense personnel reflect greater concern than that which was captured in this 
intelligence dataset.
As stated elsewhere, the news media have securitized Russian 
engagement in the Arctic much more than either the intelligence captured here or 
U.S. policy over the course of the last decade. State Department cables are 
particularly measured in their language. The handful of statements captured in 
this project’s intelligence dataset that expressed concern typically originated from 
non-U.S. speakers. Intelligence from another, more defense-oriented intelligence
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agency with an inherently more securitized view of Russia (and the world in 
general) may well yield different results, but, to state the obvious, I did not have 
access to such intelligence.
This research could be expanded and improved in a variety of ways. 
Gaining access to different intelligence sources such as Department of Defense- 
sponsored intelligence or items created by or for specific consumption of the 
Central Intelligence Agency or Defense Intelligence Agency, could clarify whether 
this particular dataset reflected a predisposition towards less-securitized or more 
diplomatic discourses.
Another way this project could be expanded in scope would be to analyze 
all of the more than 11,000 documents shared through Wikileaks that mention 
the “Arctic” and “Russia.” Analyzing all available data would allow greater 
confidence in the findings. However such an undertaking would require far more 
time than I could reasonably allot to this aspect of the thesis research. Finally, by 
adding a temporal aspect, I would be able to more fully analyze how the 
discourse evolved over time. This could help determine whether a subset of the 
discourse became securitized at a particular point in time, but more generally it 
would help to better track content patterns that are affected by temporal factors.
This research has determined that, as reflected in this dataset, U.S. policy 
and U.S. Arctic intelligence are in agreement in not securitizing Russian 
engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s. The data shows clearly that the 
answer to my first research question: “Did intelligence securitize Russian Arctic 
engagement in the early 2000s?” is no. Documents in this dataset are not
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predominantly negative in sentiment, and are just as likely to be neutral or 
positive as negative in sentiment. The most classified items in the dataset, 17 
secret cables, contain content that discuss cooperative aspects of NATO’s 
capacity predominantly. Other main content trends pertain to Arctic cooperation 
and developments in the Russian energy sector. While security and defense 
issues arise, and security and defense actors in the Arctic participate and are 
mentioned in this dataset, the data does not exhibit a securitized tone.
The second question of this thesis was, "Do narrative patterns and 
perceptions in U.S. Arctic intelligence align with U.S. Arctic policy?” Analysis and 
comparison of content and sentiment patterns find that U.S. Arctic policy is less 
securitized in tone than the U.S. Arctic intelligence examined here. This 
conclusion rests on the generally positive sentiment in the Arctic policy 
documents, the absence of references to Russia, and the more frequent 
mentions of diplomatic entities and geographic centers than defense bases or 
organizations.
I therefore find general agreement between the U.S. intelligence captured 
in this dataset and U.S. Arctic policy: neither securitized Russian engagement in 
the Arctic in the time period studied. These findings align with observed non­
securitized behavior of the U.S. government in regards to the Arctic during this 
time period.
A broader question drives this research: Why does the U.S. lag behind 
other Arctic nations in Arctic infrastructure, in Arctic industrial development, and
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in Arctic military and coast guard defense capacity?97 While this project has 
determined that intelligence had not securitized Russian behavior in the Arctic, 
and that there was no disconnect with regard to security between policy and 
intelligence, the project has only scratched the surface of this larger question 
regarding the lack of U.S. engagement in the Arctic in the early 2000s.
I propose three possible options to account for the lack of engagement of the 
United States government in Arctic affairs:
• Option 1: Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s was not, in fact, a 
threat to U.S. national security.
• Option 2: U.S. intelligence failed to contextualize Russian Arctic 
engagement in the early 2000s, and therefore failed to recognize the 
threat it posed and continues to pose to U.S. national security.
• Option 3: Other, non-intelligence factors govern securitization of the Arctic 
and how it aligns with U.S. Arctic engagement. These factors include other 
crises, in particular terrorism and turmoil in the Middle East, which 
eclipsed Russian engagement in the Arctic.
As for the first two possibilities, much uncertainty persists about the degree of 
threat posed to the United States by Russian engagement in the Arctic. Even in a 
“post-Crimea” world U.S. discourse surrounding Russian engagement in the 
Arctic remains fragmented. Across key security agencies in the United States, 
consensus seems to be emerging that the United States must enhance its 
presence and capacities in the Arctic, although specific policies have not
97 It should be noted that U.S. subsurface and air capacity remain quite high.
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emerged. In mid-2015 key defense actors including Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter,98 USCG Admiral Paul Zukunft,99 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Martin Dempsey100 publically and officially recognized the severe gap in U.S. 
Arctic preparedness and policy. Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski has been very 
vocal101 about needs for special Arctic provisioning for army, navy, air force, and 
coast guard forces to respond to potential Arctic conflicts. A growing concern 
about Russia and Russia in the Arctic informs this dialogue, but no clear 
consensus has informed policy. Senator Murkowski reported at a May 2015 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on defense spending: "I was at the Arctic 
Council Meeting last week with Secretary Kerry, and all anybody wanted to talk 
about was Russia’s Arctic push and what we were going to do with that regard. . .
. I think we are all trying to understand exactly what Russia is doing here.”102 
Uncertainty and inaction still typify the United States’ response to Russian 
engagement in the Arctic.
Granted, no major conflicts have taken place in the Arctic, or as a direct 
result of a contested Arctic issue. This gives some credence to Option 1, that
98 Erica Martinson, "Carter: US Arctic Defense Policy Falls Short,” Alaska Dispatch News, May 06, 2015, accessed October 13, 2015, https://www.adn.com/article/20150506/carter-us-arctic- defense-policy-falls-short.
99 "Coast Guard Commandant Says U.S. Falling Far Behind Russia in Arctic,” DoD Buzz, April 14, 2015, Accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/04/14/coast-guard-commandant- says-u-s-falling-far-behind-russia-in-arctic/.
100 "Secretary Carter and General Dempsey Testimony on Defense Department’s 2016 Budget.” 2015. C-SPAN.org. Accessed July 6.http://www.c-span.org/video/?325804-1/secretary-carter- general-dempsey-testimony-defense-departments-2016-budget.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
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Russian engagement in the Arctic is not actually a threat to U.S. national 
security. But I believe that Option 2, that U.S. intelligence failed to contextualize 
Russian Arctic engagement in the early 2000s, which is in fact a threat to U.S. 
national security), is much more likely to be true.
Russian foreign policy in general, and in regard to the Arctic in particular 
during the early 2000s should be of concern to U.S. national security. The most 
troubling aspect of Russian foreign policy behavior is its demonstrated lack of 
regard for sovereign territory, and its use of mixed military forces to achieve 
these aims. Russian willingness to engage non-state actors, unidentified military 
forces, and cyber-attacks, and its ability to handily operate in gray areas of 
international law to further its goals undermines a global political structure built 
upon the supremacy of international law and state sovereignty. A variety of Arctic 
actors and observers share these views; yet the international community has not 
come to consensus on securitization of Russian behavior in the Arctic.
The tide is changing in this regard, and the summer and fall of 2015 saw 
increasing wariness of Russian aggression. The Unites States’ National Military 
Strategy released in June 2015 documents a high degree of concern about 
Russia’s recent behavior. According to this document, Russia “has repeatedly 
demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is 
willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining 
regional security directly and through proxy forces.”103 A 2015 report from the
174
103 “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015 National Military Strategy.pdf.
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U.S. Center for European Policy Analysis on Baltic security (a non-federal group)
takes a very doom and gloom approach to the complicated interdependencies
involving NATO and non-NATO states. The think tank’s report argues that
Russian behavior may reveal fatal weaknesses in NATO and in U.S. military
capacity, and that Russian aggression ultimately could upset global world order:
NATO could be revealed as powerless, perhaps without even a shot being fired. America’s role as the ultimate guarantor of European security would be over in a matter of hours. That would end the rules-based European order... It would herald a Hobbesian age—all too familiar in other parts of the world—in which big countries do the deals that they can, and small countries accept the outcomes that they must. Such a humbling of America in Europe would have a huge and potentially catastrophic effect on security elsewhere. Allies such as Japan, Taiwan (Republic of China) and South Korea would find it hard to believe American security guarantees. They would be strongly tempted to either make their own arrangements with the authorities in Beijing or engage in a destabilizing nuclear arms race to guarantee their own security.104
This is a very stark vision of future developments, but Russia’s behavior in 
Crimea and Ukraine substantiates the report’s claims that European 
interdependencies have prevented a successful and swift securitized response to 
Russia’s aggression. American and Western European values, business 
practices, legal frameworks, and way of ordering the world are increasingly falling 
on deaf ears with powerful non-Western states. Failing to fully recognize that 
Russia, China, and some Middle Eastern states are playing by a different set of 
rules entirely, prohibits the United States from responding effectively or
104 Edward Lucas, “The Coming Storm Baltic Sea Security Report,” Center for European Policy Analysis, June 2015,http://www.cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report- %20%282%29.compressed.pdf, 3.
implementing a strategy to its own advantage. Willing Russia to "fall in line” is not 
effective policy in the Arctic, or elsewhere in the world.
As for Option 3, since Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk Speech, the Arctic 
has experienced an era of peace. Western Arctic states welcomed this new era 
with relief and enthusiasm. Despite 2014 and 2015 being years of concern and 
uncertainty over Russian Arctic intentions, optimism dominated the U.S. public 
stance on Russian Arctic engagement until late 2015. As late as May 2015, 
Director of the Arctic Program at the Pew Charitable Trusts Scott Highleyman 
said, "I think the Arctic genuinely is shaping up to be the exception to the rule... 
The United States and Russia seem to be trying really hard to keep talking to 
each other.”105 What has fueled U.S. persistence in striving for peace in the 
Arctic well into 2015?
One factor, illustrated in this project’s dataset, is U.S. entanglement in 
other, stickier geopolitical issues. Crises in the Middle East, domestic and 
international implications of a global economic downturn, and a more volatile 
world overall strained U.S. resources during the timeframe of this research 
project. The second Obama administration, in the run up to the U.S. 
chairmanship of the Arctic Council, is engaging more actively in Arctic issues. 
That being said, the United States appears to be viewing the Arctic from a 
broader perspective than does Russia. This perspective includes considerations 
of climate change, indigenous rights, oil production, environmental stewardship,
105Andrew E. Kramer, "Russia and U.S. Find Common Cause in Arctic Pact,” The New York Times, May 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/world/russia-and-us-find-common- cause-in-arctic-pact.html.
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health of Arctic communities, and other broad spectrum security issues. This 
broad perspective of U.S. interests in the Arctic, coupled with a low level of 
regional security concerns, in contrast with general alarm regarding Middle East 
developments, all contribute to anemic U.S. engagement in the Arctic.
Instead of examining U.S. engagement in the Arctic as a lack of response, 
perhaps it is more useful to ask what behaviors characterize U.S. response to an 
increasingly aggressive Russia in the Arctic. Many actors have indicated unease 
concerning Russia’s intentions, while others express uncertainty about the true 
nature of Russia’s military or industry capacities. Some have communicated a 
pragmatic desire for cooperation and peace. Remarks by Heather Connelly of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies quoted in the Washington Post in 
April 2015 fall into all three of these categories. "I think we need a more robust 
assessment of Russia’s capabilities, modernization and intent in the Arctic,” she 
said. "And we need to send some very clear messages privately and publicly to 
the Kremlin that we all want the Arctic to remain a place of international 
cooperation.”106 Her comments demonstrate widespread uncertainty about 
Russia’s current capacity in the Arctic and Russian intentions in the Arctic. It is 
uncertainty about Russian intent, uncertainty about Russian capacity, and a 
desire for an enduring Arctic peace and cooperation that seem to be the three 
main conditions shaping U.S. response to Russian engagement in the Arctic.
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106 Michael E. Miller, "Arctic ‘chill’ as Russia Reverts to Cold War Air and Sea Confrontations,” The Washington Post, April 17, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning- mix/wp/2015/04/17/arctic-chill-as-russia-reverts-to-cold-war-air-and-sea-confrontations/.
Considering the boldness of Russia’s recent behavior in the Arctic, and 
the clarity of its Arctic strategy published in 2008, such uncertainty is puzzling. 
Russia seems to be quite steadily achieving its publicly stated goals of updating 
and expanding its military capacity in the Arctic. This includes land, air, and sea- 
based operations. In light of this determined pursuit of its publically expressed 
aims, the West’s persistent vision of a peaceful and cooperative Arctic seems 
naive; Russia has clearly stated that it needs to develop its Arctic region. Given 
Russia’s bold pursuit of its interests in Crimea and Ukraine, it appears likely that 
Russia will similarly pursue and protect its interests in the Arctic.
This research encompassed by this thesis finds no indication that the U.S. 
intelligence community, the State Department or even President Obama himself 
has securitized Russian activity in the Arctic. I conclude that uncertainty about 
Russian intent, diverse domestic policy interests, and geopolitical threats 
elsewhere in the world have left the United States vulnerable to Russian 
aggression. Russian strategic dominance, U.S. incapacity to respond effectively, 
and international interdependencies within the Arctic pave the way for Russia to 
pursue its interests unhindered.
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Appendix A
List o f important words as identified by researcher from context and dataset text 
A
activist, activists, aerial, aerospace, agreement, aircraft, airport, airspace, alarm, Alaska, 
allegation, allegations, allege, anti-terror, argue , argued, argues, Arkhangelsk, armed , 
arms , attack , attacking, attacks , autocracy, award, awarded, awarding, awards
B
backfire, Beaufort, behavior, belong, Bering, bluster, bomb , boost, border , boring, BP, 
bribe, bribery, bribes, business, Canada, Canadian, carrier, Chilingarov, Chupriyan, CIA  
, Cold War,
C
combatant, combatants, comment, complicated, concern, concerned, concerns, 
confidence, confidence-build ing, conflict, congress, Congress, consequences, 
construction, constructive, corrupt, corrupted, corruption, counter, court, creep, crime, 
crim inal, crisis, critcism , critic, critical, criticize, cutoff
D
danger, Danish, dead, death, defeat, defeated, defeating, defensive, defensiveness, 
delimit, delim iting, Denmark, desertion, desire, desired, destroy, destroy, destroyed, 
destroyer, destroying, destruction, DHS, die, dirty, disarmament, disdain, disease, 
dismiss, dism issal, disrupt, disrupted, disruption, disturb, disturbing, DoD, DOD, Duma, 
dying
E
EEZ, election, emergencies, emergency, emergent, emerging, Enel, enemies, enemy, 
energy, Eni, enrich, enriched, environment, ESA, evidence, evil, exacerbate, 
exacerbating, exaggerate, exaggerated, exaggerating, excitement, explicit, exploit, 
exploitation, exploited, exploiting, export, extreme, extremely, extrem ist, Exxon, 
ExxonMobil,
F
fear, fearful, fears, fight, fighting, firm, fish, fisheries, fishing, fraud, freeze, freezing, 
freight, fringe, fringes, FSB
G
gas, Gazprom , Gorshkov, GPS, G reenland, G reenlandic, grievance, grievances  
H
hamper, hard, hate, hazard, hazardous, hazing, health, high north, humiliate, hum iliation, 
hum iliations, hydrocarbon, hydrocarbons
I
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ice-class, Iceland, Icelandic, illegal, impact, import, importation, imprisonment, in­
fighting, incarcerated, incarceration, incident, incidents, indigenous, industry, 
intelligence, ire
K
kickback, kickbacks, kiss o f death, Kola, Kremlin,
L
launch, Lavrov, law, leadership, legal, limit, lim iting, listen, LNG, love, Lukoil 
M
mafia, Magadan, map, mapping, maps, march, marine, maritime, market, markets, 
Matviyenko, McFaul, Medvedev, mess, mine, m ineral, mining, morale, Moscow, 
movement, Murmansk, muscle, muscular
N
native, NATO, Navy, negative, negatives, Nenets, north, northern, Northern Sea Route, 
Norway, Norwegian, Novatek, NSR, nuclear
O
ocean, oceans, offshore, oil, onshore, oppose, opposition, order, ordered, orders, 
overtures
P
party, Party, patrol, Patrushev, peace, peaceful, Pechora, perceive, perceived, phobia, 
phobias, pipeline, piracy, pirate, pirated, polar, polarizing, pole, police, political, politician, 
politics, port, portrayal, portrayals, positive, positives, possibility, posture, power, power, 
powerful, pride, prided, Prirazlomnoye, prison, prisoner, prisoners, prisons, problem, 
problems, progress, prom inent, protection, protest, proud, provocation, provocation, 
provocations, provoke, provoked, Putin
R
radiation, radioactive, raid, rally, reactor, reactors, rebuff, rebuffed, reject, rejected, 
rejecting, rejection, remarks, repression, research, resource, resources, rhetoric, rights, 
risk, robust, rocky, Rogozin, Roscosmos, Rosneft, rough, rude, rudeness, rumor, 
rumors, Russneft
S
sad, safe, safety, Sakhalin, science, scientific, sea, seabed, seas, seawater, Sechin, 
security, sensitive, sensitivities, serious, SeverEnergiya, Severodvinsk, Sevmash, 
shame, shelf, Shell, ship, shipyard, Shtokman, significant, silence, sincere, sincerity, 
skeptical, snipe, soft, Soviet, S t. Petersburg, stance, StatoilHydro, stupid, stupidity, 
submarine, submarines, submerged, surprise, surprising, Sweden, Swedish
T
tension, tensions, Termeftegaz, terror, terrorist, threat, TNK-BP, tough, trafficked, 
trafficking, transport, tribal, tw ist
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U
UN, underwater, unhelpful, unmanned, unwilling, unwillingness, uranium, USAID,
USCG,
V
Varandey, Vasiliev, vessel, vessels, victim , victims, violations, V ladivostock, vote, votes, 
vulnerabilities, vulnerable, Vysotsky
W
war, warhead, warhead, warheads, waring, water, weak, weapon, weapons, w illing, 
willingness, wish, w ishful, w ishfully
Y
Yakutia, Yamal 
Z
Zvyozdochka
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Appendix B
Type of 
Sweep
Sources 
(February 2010)
Sources (April 2011)
Quick Sweep RIA (Russia) Itar-Tass Kyiv Post Radio Free Europe Gazeta.Kz Trend news Kazakhstan Today
n/a
Intermediary AOR Sweep GazetaPravdaForUmBeltaBaltic Course Ferghana news Pan Armenian Civil.Ge
n/a
FULLFSUSWEEP:Russia
RIA Novosti ITAR TASS Gazeta Pravda Russia Today RBC News Regnum News Moscow Times Barents Observer
BBC “Week Ahead” calendar for Former Soviet UnionInterfax.ruITAR TASSPrime TASSKommersantRIA NovostiRBC NewsMoscow TimesRegnum NewsFerghana
FULLFSUSWEEP:Ukraine
Kyiv PostInterfax UkraineUNUnianForUm
http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148 http://www.ukraine-observer.com/ - monthly http://www2 .pravda.com.ua/en/ http://www.moreover.com/cgi- local/page?page?o=portal&feed=374NRCU http://www.unian.net/eng/online/12 / http://www.kyivpost.com/ http://www.ukrainianiournal.com/index.php http://otherside.com.ua/news/rubrics.php?lang=3&rubric id
= 1http://en.for-ua.com/http://www.interfax.kiev.ua/eng/ - for subscribers http://www.ukrinform.com/eng/search/?r[]=1 -  for subscribershttp://mignews.com.ua/en/archive/2007/04/04/
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FULLFSUSWEEP:Belarus
BeltaCharter'97 www.belta.byhttp://www.belapan.com/enhttp://www.belarustoday.info/?sid=87 -  not much updated
Full FSUSweep:Moldova
Moldova Azi Moldpres http://politicom.moldova.org/index/eng/ http://www .azi.md/en.html http://www.basa.md/http://www.interlic.md/index.php?lang=eng http://www .reporter.md/en/
Full FSUSweep:Baltics
Baltic Course Baltic Times balticbusinessnew sBaltic Reports
n/a
Full FSUSweep:GeneralCentralAsia/Caucasus
Radio Free EuropeFerghana news Eurasianet
n/a
Full FSUSweep:Kazakhstan
Gazeta.Kz Interfax Kazakhstan KT
http://eng.gazeta.kz/http://www.inform.kz/index.php?lang=enghttp://www.kz-today.kz/index.php?lang=eng&act=by sechttp://www.kazpravda.kz/index.php?lang=eng http://www.interfax.kz/?lang=eng&int id=14&function=view&news id=11799
Full FSUSweep:Uzbekistan
UzReportUzA http://www.rferl.org/featuresarchive/country/uzbekistan.htmlhttp://iahon.mfa.uz/index.php?newlang=enghttp://www.uza.uz/en/
Full FSUSweep:Tajikistan
n/a http://tajikistan.neweurasia.net/http://www.avesta.tj/en/http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/
Full FSUSweep:Kyrgyzstan
n/a http://eng.24.kg/http://en.kabar.kg/http://www.akipress.com/ en arc.php?catid=|ief|http://www.akipress.com/ en arc.php?catid=|erf|http://www.ktr.kg/news/en/ - not updated
Full FSUSweep:Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan.ru http://www.rferl.org/featuresarchive/country/turkmenistan.htmlhttp://www.turkmenistan.ru/?lang id=en&&sort=date desc
Full FSU Trend news http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/en/index.pl
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Sweep:Azerbaiian APANews. Az AzerNEWS
http://analitika.az/browse.php?sec id=8 -  weekly, MON http://en.apa.az/last.php?show=3 http://www.azerbaijan.az/ News/ news e.html?lang=enhttp://www.today.az/view latest news.php http://www.azertag.com/index en.html
Full FSU Sweep: Armenia Pan Armenian News.am Panorama Aysor
http://www .arka.am/http://mediaforum.am/armtoday.php?LangID=1http://www.defacto.am/index.php?0P=71303168http://www.arminfo.info/http://www.armenpress.am/eng/news/news.htm http://new.aravot.am/en/ http://new.aravot.am/en/articles/politics http://www.yerkir.am/eng/?sub=last news http://www.panorama.am/en/ http://www.panarmenian.net/ www.armenianow.com -  weekly, FRI http://www.a1plus.am/en/?page=LatestNews -  TVhttp://www.armradio.am/ - RADIO
Full FSU Sweep: Georgia Civil.Ge Rustavi 2 Georgian Times
http://www.radio-imedi.ge/eng/http://www.imedinews.ge/en/georgiahttp://eng.primenewsonline.com/http://www.geotimes.ge/?lang=enghttp://www.messenger.com.ge/http://www.accessnorthga.com/http://www.rustavi2 .com.ge/index.phphttp://www.georgiatoday.ge/articles.php?cat=Politics&version=349
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Appendix C 
Top Tag Categories in Cablegate Collection
Top 20 Tags Significance freq
PREL Political Affairs - External Political Relations 125
RS and RU Russia 73
PGOV Political Affairs - Government; Internal Governmental Affairs 70
SENV Social Affairs - Environment 46
NO Norway 45
ENRG Economic Affairs - Energy and Power 40
ECON Economic Affairs - Economic Conditions Trends and Potential 38
MARR Military and Defense Affairs - Military and Defense Arrangements 33
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 31
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EPET Economic Affairs - Petroleum and Natural Gas 24
MOPS Military and Defense Affairs - Military Operations 23
AF Afghanistan 19
PINR Political Affairs - Intelligence 18
ETRD Economic Affairs - Foreign Trade 17
KGHG Global Climate Change 15
PHUM Political Affairs - Human Rights 15
PARM Political Affairs - Arms Controls and Disarmament 12
DA Denmark 11
FI Finland 11
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